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SYNOPSIS 
The structure of the enquiry will be as follows. The 
first chapter will consist of some Introductory comments which 
will be followed with a sketch of the theories of metaphor 
suggested by Philip Wegener and I.A. Richards. Wegener 
argues that metaphor Is the source of all generality, and 
Richards that It Is the omnipresent principle of language. I 
shall reject both these sweeping claims. 
In chapter II I will consider the relation between 
metaphor and simile. It has been argued that metaphor gains 
Its meaning from an Implied literal comparison which the 
equivalent simile states. This is the comparison view of 
metaphor, and I shall argue that it is untenable. 
Chapter III will be concerned with the highly influential 
interaction view of metaphor proposed by Black. Black argues 
that both components of a metaphorical statement undergo a 
change in meaning, and that it is not possible to produce an 
equivalent paraphrase. Black's account provides some important 
insights, but I will suggest that there are some difficulties, 
notably concerning the change in meaning of a metaphor and the 
question of paraphrase. 
Acceptance of the comparison view would provide a simple 
affirmative answer to the question whether a metaphorical 
statement can be adequately re-expressed in other terms. But 
rejection of the comparison vievj does not entail rejection of 
the possibility of paraphrase. In chapter IV I shall argue 
that the possibility of producing a paraphrase is in fact a 
condition of significance for metaphor. But in an important 
sense the paraphrase, while capturing the content of the 
metaphor, does not provide the insight that the metaphor did. 
This will be followed by chapter V in which I shall consider 
some problems for the paraphrase programme, in particular 
those which emerge from synaesthetic or intersensory metaphor. 
1 will argue that even this problematic case is amenable to 
paraphrase. 
The enquiry will conclude with chapter VI in which I 
will consider the relation between metaphors and category 
mistakes. Accepting category mistakes as meaningless would 
entail rejecting a large number of metaphors as unintelligible, 
and I will argue that this consequence, which emerges from 
the analy ses of Ryle and Sommers, must be rejected for more 
reasons than just the significance of metaphor. Category 
mistakes, 1 will argue, are not meaningless, but a priori 
false. 1 will argue further that metaphors are also a priori 
false statements, but that a priori falsehood is no barrier to 
truth. 
C H A P T E R O N E 
Some T h e o r i e s o f Metaphor 
1. 
Metaphor, Aristotle tells us. Is "...giving a thing a 
name which belongs to something else"^. As a definition this 
is imperfect in a number of respects, but it is probably as 
good as any that might be offered as a preliminary character-
ization. Almost any descriptive term in a language whose 
history can be traced can be shown to have once been 
metaphorical; originating usually, we are told, from the 
description of a solid sensible object, or some animal (probably 
human) activity . The common Latin verb for "think" (puto) 
derives etymologically from vine-pruning. Language develops 
and is refined as a result of our need to introduce new 
distinctions and eliminate old ones, and it will emerge that 
one of the most pervasive means of achieving this end is 
through the use of metaphor. 
A distinction must therefore be drawn between "live" or 
"fresh" and "frozen" or "dead" metaphor. Fresh metaphor can 
be roughly characterized as an obvious case of metaphor, that 
is, a case where a familiar literal application of the 
expression is known, and where some relation between the literal 
and metaphorical use is recognized. Frozen metaphor, on the 
other hand, is generally and correctly not recognized as 
metaphor at all: constant and consistent figurative use of the 
expression has resulted in the acceptance of the term as 
ordinary part of the literal vocabulary. There is no sharp 
dividing line between fresh and frozen metaphor, and our 
language abounds with cases of partially frozen metaphors which 
1 Aristotle, Poetics, Ch.21, 1457^7 
2 Barfield, Poetic Diction, p.64 
2. 
are revived easily enough. I will use the term "transparent" 
to designate those cases of metaphor which, if attended to, are 
unmistakably metaphorical, but whose intended meaning within 
context is nevertheless immediately clear. The need for a 
distinction between transparent and non-transparent metaphor 
will become clear later in the enquiry, and it will emerge 
that this distinction is actually of greater importance than 
that between fresh and frozen metaphor. A number of theories 
have run into considerable difficulties because they assume 
that we can explicate metaphor only through its wholesale 
elimination in favour of literal expressions. I shall argue 
that the programme of wholesale elimination is misconceived; 
the need for explication emerges from the requirements of 
semantic clarity rather than from the intrinsic nature of the 
literal and the metaphorical. The tendency to treat frozen 
metaphor as genuine metaphor has also created difficulties for 
some theories. Though frozen metaphor may be of considerable 
interest to the etymologist, we shall see that it is not 
metaphor at all. 
Metaphor has frequently been considered to be an Isolated 
phenomenon; a fortunate accident of language whereby we are 
able to express ourselves more colourfully, but essentially a 
figure of speech which it is always in principle possible -
some have argued desirable - to eliminate in favour of 
equivalent, if less exciting, literal paraphrases. At the other 
extreme we find writers who discover in metaphor a transcendent 
source of truth which cannot be approached by our mundane 
3. 
literal language"^, and the source of all generality . I do 
not think that either of these claims can be substantiated. 
But I shall argue that far from being an ornament to language, 
metaphor is of considerable importance if we are to retain our 
capacity to formulate and change our conceptions of the world. 
It is of course compatible with this view that metaphor is used 
only as a cognitive aid and can always be avoided in favour of 
perhaps more cumbersome literal modes of expression. The 
answers to the questions raised here will have to await a more 
detailed examination of the elimination programme. But whatever 
the answer might be to the elimination question the importance 
of the enquiry is testified to by the fact that it seldom 
happens that one gets through two consecutive sentences of 
fluid discourse without recourse to metaphor. 
There is a frequently cited dichotomy which divides language 
into what may be called scientific or descriptive language on 
the one hand, and expressive or figurative language on the other. 
These two aspects, or more accurately, uses, of language, are 
often regarded as distinct; and ordinary discourse is commonly 
supposed to be a mixture of the two. At one extreme, it is said, 
we find the precise, unambiguous statements of science, while 
at the other lies the vague, amorphous language of myth and 
poetry. Metaphor is often supposed to be a part of expressive 
language, and it has been argued, particularly by philosophers 
with positIvist leanings, that the use of metaphorical expressions 
has no cognitive value. Ayer^, for example, has argued that all 
3 Martin Poss, Symbol and Metaphor, is a prominent exponent 
of this view. 
4 Philip Wegener's arguments to this conclusion will be 
considered below. 
5 A.J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic 
knowledge concerns either analytic truths or truths which can 
be established by empirical observation. Expressive language 
therefore adds nothing to a statement of fact, but simply 
reveals, at best, certain attitudes of the speaker. Insofar 
as there Is some advantage to be gained from the expression 
of feelings, figurative language may be efficacious, but holds 
no cognitive value. The argument Is not designed to persuade 
us that figurative, and a fortiori metaphorical, expressions 
are to be eschewed, but simply that they are devoid of 
empirical content. Qulne^ has argued not that ordinary 
language stands In need of reform, but that every conceptually 
significant feature of language can be expressed In the 
canonical notation of classical quantification theory. It 
follows, of course, that the features of language which are not 
captured, which Include figurative expressions, are not 
conceptually significant. The position adopted by Ayer and 
Qulne appears to be one of tolerance to figurative language as 
a quirk, but to concede no cognitive Importance to It. 
Other philosophers have been less benign, and have 
condemned figurative tropes as a rich source of error and 
confusion to be avoided at all costs. Hobbes, for example, 
lists the use of "metaphors, tropes, and other rhetorical 
7 
figures" as one of the seven causes of absurd assertions, and 
goes on to entreat his readers to follow the paradigm of 
Euclidean precision. Many other philosophers while not 
engaging In a general vendetta, have Isolated metaphors as the 
source of particular philosophical confusions. For example. 
6 W.V.O. Qulne, Word and Object 
7 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, p.85 
5. 
J.L. Austin, In discussing the argument from illusion, writes, 
"now first, though the phrase 'deceived by our senses' is a 
o 
common metaphor, it ^ a metaphor" . The implication appears 
to be that metaphor is at least misleading, and certainly less 
than the literal truth, if not straightforwardly false. It is 
also interesting that no further specification of the offence 
is needed: the argument is at once held under suspicion simply 
by attaching the epithet "metaphor". A little later on he 
writes: 
We have here, in fact, a typical case of a word, which 
already has a very special use, being gradually 
stretched, without caution or definition or any limit, 
until it becomes, first perhaps obscurely metaphorical, 
but ultimately meaningless.^ 
This statement suggests a not idiosyncratic view that the use 
of metaphor lies on the path of obscurity which leads 
ultimately to nonsense. 
It would be foolish to suggest that people have not been 
misled by metaphors, as indeed they have been misled by 
literal expressions. But perhaps there are some features of 
metaphors which make them especially dangerous; a tendency, 
for example, to carry some aspect of the literal meaning of the 
expression over to the metaphorical application where it is no 
longer appropriate. An unvigilant use of metaphor has 
certainly been the source of confusion, but it is also true, 
and frequently not recognized, that metaphor is an important 
device in our conceptual armoury. It will be one of the aims of 
this enquiry to attempt to substantiate this claim. 
8 J.L. Austin, Sense and Sensibilla, p.11 
9 J.L. Austin, op. cit., p.15 
6. 
That metaphor is problematic Is attested to by such 
paradoxical characterizations of It as "significant self-
contradlctlon"^^ and "calculated category-mistake"^^. It Is 
often claimed that a precondition of significant discourse Is 
that It should be an orderly, rule-governed affair. Without 
such control. It Is said, words become too plastic to support 
stable meanings, and the very possibility of analysis dissolves 
with language as a whole. How Is It that metaphors can be 
meaningful If they In fact depend, as they appear to, on the 
systematic violation of the rules on which meaning Is said to 
depend? That Is, how are we able to understand, let alone gain 
Insight, from what Is prima facie a deliberate misuse of an 
expression? One suggested answer Is that this misuse Is only 
apparent, and that there are "higher" rules which govern our 
metaphorical use of expressions. This claim will be 
considered further In a later chapter. 
Those philosophers who have ventured an account of 
metaphor have not yet developed anything like a universally 
accepted terminology. This produces some problems In 
comparing the various theories that have been proposed. However, 
the fundamental problem Is the relation between the metaphorical 
and the literal, and the major question to emerge Is: can what 
Is said metaphorically be said literally? The denial of the 
possibility of paraphrase does not commit one to a special 
world of transcendent meanings, nor does the acceptance of the 
10 Monroe Beardsley, Aesthetics, p.l4l 
11 Nelson Goodman, Languages of Art, p.73 
7 . 
possibility of equivalent literal paraphrase necessarily rule 
out metaphor as cognitlvely unimportant. I shall argue that 
metaphor is cognitlvely significant and, with some 
qualifications, that a paraphrase can always be provided. 
The first discussion of metaphor which I shall consider 
12 
is the one provided by Philip Wegener . I shall argue that 
metaphor is a process whereby we generalize sense, but 
Wegener's claim is the stronger one that metaphor is the 
source of all generality. His account may be sketched as 
follows. 
Language is first acquired through the use of single 
words. This does not mean that words function like proper 
names in the most primitive instancesi that is a sophisticated 
notion which is acquired much later in development. Rather 
the word fixes attention on a point of interest within some 
context, and it is only within this context that the word can 
be understood. At this stage, of course, the context is non-
verbal. A child, for example, may say the word "outside", 
meaning he or she wishes to go outside, or to draw the 
attention of the attentive adult to some object or phenomenon 
which is outside, and which is apparent within the total 
context of assertion. It is the context which provides the 
setting in which the word is used, and thereby enables the 
thought behind the word to be understood. Thus, though 
language begins with Individual words, the word can be said to 
express a thought or sentence. 
12 Philip Wegener, Untersuchungen liber die Grundfragen 
des Sprachlebens. The account is derived from 
Susanne Langer, Philosophy in a New Key, pp.l36-l4l 
8. 
Wegener claims that the development of fully articulate 
language from such humble beginnings is possible in accordance 
with two general principles of linguistic development: 
emendation, which begets syntactical forms of speech, and 
metaphor, the source of generality. Wegener argues that in 
primitive communication of the one-word variety, the 
expressions that we might suppose are used by infants or 
people in the early stages of acquisition of a foreign language 
(without the benefit of phrase-books), can be used only to 
express fairly primitive ideas. To reach higher levels of 
abstraction more is required. At this primitive level 
considerable like-mindedness is required; this is assisted by 
the extra-linguistic contextual factors, and depends on the 
assumption that the hearer shares to some extent the speaker's 
attitudes and interests. But differences inevitably arise, and 
the speaker finds himself misunderstood. The expression needs 
further refinement and this is achieved by emendation of the 
original one-word sentence. This emendation may take the form 
of gestures, added inflections, or additional vocables, and 
these latter forms of qualification commence a drive towards 
the evolution of grammatical structure. Thus Wegener claims 
that grammatical structure derives from the undifferentiated 
context of the one-word sentence, and the fixed denotation of 
separate words emerges gradually from the total context of 
assertion. This is perhaps a more plausible account than that 
which attempts to build the complexities of discursive speech 
out of supposedly primitive words with distinctly substantive 
or relational connotations. 
Though language structure may result from the need for 
emendation, the contexts In which this structure develops are 
unique: the expression Is always applied In a particular 
concrete situation. To achieve generality an expression must 
get beyond the particularity of the context In which It Is 
Introduced. It Is a metaphorical extension of the expression 
which makes this possible. 
Wegener claims that discourse contains two elements, 
which may be called the context (verbal or practical), and 
the novelty. The novelty Is what the speaker Is attempting to 
point out or express, and the word used to express the novelty 
Is determined or modified by the context. Since there are 
always contextual differences between the Initial and 
subsequent uses of an expression, the later uses are, at 
least Initially, metaphorical. If the expression Is used 
frequently. It becomes apparent that some of the aspects of the 
context are to be Ignored, and the metaphor becomes accepted as 
having a literal meaning through the successful generalization 
of Its sense. Thus generality Is achieved by metaphorical 
extension of the Initial use of a word, which Is subsequently 
taken to Include what Is common to the old and the new senses. 
By abstracting the common features from different contexts the 
metaphor acquires generality and freezes, thus becoming a general 
term of our literal vocabulary. This primitive use of metaphor 
to achieve generality Is essentially the same as the more 
sophisticated employment to draw attention to some feature 
shared by contexts which otherwise may be very different Indeed. 
10. 
The context makes clear that the word cannot be taken in 
its usual sense; a thought cannot be literally weighty, a 
wine reticent, or a silence pregnant; but some aspect of the 
literal meaning of the metaphorical expression is being brought 
to bear on the principal subject of the assertion. If the 
metaphor is used frequently the relevant aspect which is 
common to the different contexts may start to dominate, and 
eventually supplant the old literal meaning. For example, the 
word "sensitive" may have been originally applicable only 
to people, and the extension to instruments, stock markets and 
so forth, at one stage a metaphor. However this usage has 
generated a general sense, something like: "extremely liable 
to be affected by external influences", and this generalized 
sense can be applied equally to people, objects and 
institutions. 
As well as being a means for the extension of meaning, 
metaphor may result in the introduction of ambiguity or 
multiple ambiguity. When an expression has been used 
metaphorically in the same sense on a number of occasions, a 
genuinely alternative, though related, sense may emerge. Thus 
the metaphors of a running stream, a fence running (around a 
boundary), a road running over the mountains, the mountain 
range running to the North, all produce a different, though 
related sense of running to the original literal meaning. 
Running acquires the sense of following a path. Constant and 
consistent figurative use has introduced a new sense of the 
word. This additional sense by no means exhausts the ambiguity 
of the word "run": trains and taps, sheep and prime ministers. 
11. 
all may run in a sense different to the one sketched above. 
And they may run in more than one sense; we rely on the 
context to indicate in which sense the expression is to be 
taken. It may not of course be apparent which sense of the 
expression is the original literal one, but this does not seem 
to me to be important. The important point is that the emergence 
of new senses, either by extension of meaning or through the 
introduction of ambiguity, can be the result of the use of 
metaphor. 
The ambiguity described here is of course different from 
that of words like "cape" or "bank" in which the alternative 
meanings bear no relation to one another. Metaphor is not 
relevant to such cases, or if it was once it has long ceased 
to be so. 
Every new experience or idea, Wegener argues, evokes first 
of all some metaphorical expression. As the idea becomes 
familiar the use of this expression freezes into a literal sense. 
This use of metaphor, which is largely unconscious, is the 
means whereby language with its necessarily limited vocabulary 
manages to embrace the indefinitely large varieties of 
experience. Metaphor is the life of language, the means whereby 
we are forever laying a deposit of abstracted concepts. The 
drive towards precision of expression and the increasing 
refinements in the distinctions we draw, produce the sharp 
definitions which enable speech to become an increasingly 
precise descriptive tool: 
until human beings can actually believe it was invented 
as a utility, and was later embellished with metaphors 
for the sake of a cultural product called poetry.^ 
13 Langer, op. cit., p.l42 
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A principal difficulty for Wegener's account is the role 
he assigns metaphor in the early stages of the acquisition of 
concepts. I shall argue later that metaphor can only occur 
against some background of literal meaning, and I think that 
this already presupposes the acquisition of general terms. A 
metaphor is itself a general term (if we use 'names' 
metaphorically, such as "a Napoleon" or "a Munich" they have 
ceased to be names). Metaphor cannot therefore be used to 
explain generality, and Wegener's suggestion that generality 
can be achieved by a metaphorical extension of particularity 
must be rejected. The account can be given some plausibility 
with such examples as the ones concerning the words "runs" and 
"sensitive", but they only make sense against a previously 
acquired and fairly sophisticated assortment of linguistic 
skills. Given such a background, we shall see metaphor is 
indeed a means of generalizing sense. But the strong claim 
that it is the source of all generality seems to me to be one 
which it would be extremely difficult to substantiate. The 
acquisition of language in any case raises formidable 
psychological questions which I prefer to avoid, and henceforth 
I shall be concerned exclusively with the operation of 
metaphor within a received conceptual system. Finally, while 
Wegener's account testifies to the importance of metaphor, it 
provides us with few clues as to what the underlying mechanisms 
through which metaphor conveys its sense might be. 
I.A. Richards presents an account of metaphor which like 
Wegener's theory makes a strong claim for metaphor's ubiquity 
14 and importance . Metaphor, Richards claims, is the omnipresent 
14 Richards, The Philosophy of Rhetoric, Chs.V and VI 
13. 
principle of our freedom of expression; the means whereby we 
are able to formulate and express our changing conceptions of 
the world. Metaphor is no grace or ornament of added power to 
language, but rather its constitutive form, and "language... 
is utterly unable to aid us except through the command of 
IK 
metaphor which it gives" . Richards draws attention to 
Bentham's conclusion that since the descriptions of any 
intellectual operation are derived from metaphors, the mind and 
all its doings are fictions, and he mentions approvingly the 
stronger conclusion of Bradley and Vaihinger that as a result 
of the irreducibly metaphorical nature of our thinking, 
"matter and all its adventures, and all the derivative objects 
of contemplation, are fictions too, of varied rank because of 
varied service"^^. The importance of the subject for philosophy 
is considerable: 
In philosophy, above all, we can take no step 
safely without an unrelaxing awareness of the 
metaphors we, and our audience, may be 
employing; and though we may pretend to eschew 
them,-, we can attempt to do so only by detecting 
them. ' 
Richards supports Bradley's contention that our pretence to do 
without metaphor is never more than a bluff waiting to be 
called. 
I think Richards' advocacy for metaphor, like Wegener's, 
borders on the excessive. A great deal of the excess emerges 
from his failure to carefully distinguish fresh and frozen 
metaphor: if we do not rule out frozen metaphor as a genuine 
instance then we do indeed become troubled by metaphor's 
15 Ibid., p.90 
16 Ibid., p.91 
17 Ibid., p.92 
14. 
ubiquity, and the distinction on which the very notion of 
metaphor depends dissolves. This is a matter to which I shall 
return. 
Richards' account of the operation of metaphor I shall call 
the interanimation account; although the term "interaction" 
appears on more than one occasion, this epithet has been 
appropriated for his own theory by Black. Metaphor, according 
to Richards, is the having of "two thoughts of different 
things active together and supported by a single word, or phrase, 
1 8 
whose meaning is the result of their interaction" . The modes 
of interaction may be of "immense variety"; it may be that of 
similarity, but this is only one of many modes. As it stands this 
characterization is clearly unsatisfactory, since it could be 
used to describe virtually any empirical statement. In "the 
crocodile is on the piano" we have two thoughts of different 
things (the crocodile and the piano) held together by a single 
phrase, and the meaning is the result of their interaction. 
Richards might reply that this is not a genuine case of inter-
action because the statement in fact expresses a single 
composite thought. He suggests later that the test for metaphor 
is whether we are able to distinguish two co-operating meanings 19 
or only a single one Unfortunately there is a dearth of 
illuminating examples, and it is difficult to determine 
exactly how this claim is to be read. But the test also looks 
inadequate; metaphor is drawn to our attention through 
inappropriateness and conflict rather than, as Richards 
suggests, by co-operation. Certainly they must result in 
18 Ibid., p.93 
19 Ibid., p.119 
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harmony J Indeed a harmony which overcomes the conflict, but 
there is no explicit statement of this essential requirement 
in Richards' theory. Richards' terminology of "tenor" and 
"vehicle" has been largely superseded, and since most of what 
is valuable in the account has been taken over by Black, 1 shall 
not examine the account in any detail. 
But the discussion of Richards' account does provide me 
with a pretext for making some comments on the relation between 
metaphor and theories of meaning. Although I do not believe 
that an analysis of metaphor will provide some particular 
theory of meaning, 1 think that an acceptance of the 
significance of metaphor will at least perform the negative 
role of ruling out some theories of meaning as inadequate. In 
particular, I think we are forced to reject any theory of 
meaning which rules out metaphor as meaningless. Richards 
spends some time arguing against the theory of meaning which he 
calls the Doctrine of Usage, which holds that the meaning of 
words is rigidly predetermined by fixed semantic rules. The 
title of this doctrine is not happily chosen since it tends to 
evoke some more or less antithetical theories associated with 
the later Wittgenstein. But it may be useful to have a label 
for this doctrine, and I shall refer to it as the Principle of 
Univocity. I shall come back to this in chapter VI in connection 
with the theories of Fred Sommers, who has proposed the most 
thorough-going development of this principle of which I am aware. 
Instead of a theory assigning words with rigidly fixed 
meanings, Richards proposes a Context Theory of Meaning, which 
claims, roughly, that the meaning of a word is the missing 
16. 
part of some context, and It is the rest of the context which 
20 
determines Its meaning . In rejecting a theory of fixed sense-
relations Richards seems to go too far In the other direction, 
and makes language so fluid that any systematic account Is 
quite Impossible. It seems to me that any satisfactory theory 
of meaning will have to admit some stabilities, though I think 
Richards Is correct In suggesting that this need not be of the 
order suggested by the Principle of Unlvoclty. 
Both Wegener and Richards burden metaphor with too heavy 
a load. Wegener's claim that metaphor Is the source of all 
generality I think must be rejected, and I also think that In 
Richards' account metaphor assumes so dominant an Influence 
that It becomes difficult to explain the existence of literal 
and unlvocal meaning. But they are a counter-balance to the 
more widespread tendency to treat metaphor as a deviant and 
expendable phenomenon. It Is against this tendency that the 
remainder of the enquiry will be directed. I shall therefore 
end this chapter with a cautionary note against treating 
metaphor as the paramount principle of meaning and language. 
I will go on to consider how the role of metaphor In language 
should In fact be seen, beginning In the next chapter with an 
examination of the relationship between metaphor and simile. 
20 Ibid., p.35 ff. 
C H A P T E R T W O 
The Comparison View 
17. 
In the last chapter I suggested that the fundamental 
question that arises in connection with metaphor is the nature 
of the relation between the metaphorical and the literal. 
Acceptance of what Black has called the comparison view^ and 
2 
Beardsley the Llteralist Theory will apparently provide a 
straightforward account of the nature of this relation. A 
metaphor on this view is the elliptical presentation of a 
comparison between two terms which an equivalent simile 
explicitly states. It is this view which I intend to examine in 
the present chapter. I will begin the examination by 
considering the widely influential views of Black, whose 
classical paper on the subject is a popular starting point 
for contemporary discussions. His discussion of the comparison 
view will be considered independently from his positive account 
of metaphor, which will be the subject of the next chapter. The 
influence of Black's paper justifies a reasonably comprehensive 
treatment, and for the sake of completeness I will include his 
account of the substitution view of metaphor, though I think 
this view is too insubstantial to merit or permit examination in 
any depth. 
After expressing the usual regrets at the widespread 
neglect of this important topic. Black sets a number of questions 
in connection with metaphor, the answers to which would provide 
some sort of analysis of the notion. The questions are: "How 
do we recognize a case of metaphor?", "Are there any criteria 
for the detection of metaphor?", "Can metaphors be translated 
1 Black, "Metaphor", in Models and Metaphors, p.35 
2 Beardsley, Aesthetics, pp.136-138 
18. 
into literal expressions?", "Is metaphor a decoration of 'plain 
sense'?", "What are the relations between metaphor and simile?", 
"In what sense, if any, is metaphor 'creative'?", "What is the 
point of using metaphor?". These questions are not taken to 
be independent or exhaustive. 
Black commences his account by providing some examples of 
metaphor, "the clouds are crying", "the chairman plowed 
through the discussion", and others. In each case he observes 
that the sentence has a literal component and a metaphorical 
component, which he calls respectively the frame and the focus. 
At this stage of the enquiry he considers it to be advisable 
to consider only simple cases: statements in which some words 
are used metaphorically and others literally. A sentence which 
is entirely metaphorical will result in an allegory or riddle. 
For example, "every cat in the dusk is grey" in the sort of 
context in which we might suppose it is standardly uttered would 
not normally be taken to be an assertion about the colour 
properties of the familiar carnivorous quadruped just before 
dark. It seems reasonable to attempt to provide some analysis of 
more straightforward occurrences of metaphorical expressions 
before such examples are dealt with. 
The basic cases, then, contain a metaphorical component 
and a non-metaphorical component, and evidently enough the 
meaning will depend on some relation between these components. 
The first example Black considers is "the chairman plowed 
through the discussion". It might be thought that the speaker 
intended to say something about the chairman's behaviour, but 
instead of saying it directly he chose a word ("plowed") which 
19. 
strictly means something else, but the hearer can easily guess 
what the speaker had In mind. This view holds metaphor to be 
a substitute for some literal expression, and the meaning of the 
sentence is taken to be the same as the sentence with the 
literal expression. Not unnaturally. Black calls this the 
substitution view. Adherents of the substitution view would 
hold that metaphor is always eliminable in favour of literal 
paraphrases. This view is fairly widespread. Fowler, for 
example, begins his essay on metaphor with the distinction 
between live and dead metaphor, saying, "...living [metaphors] 
are offered and accepted with a consciousness of their nature 
as substitutes for their literal equivalents...(my emphasis). 
And if we ask why the writer performs the substitution, and the 
reader in consequence the inverse substitution, we may be told 
that the metaphor provides us with convenient abbreviations; 
that is, metaphor is a species of catachresis. When catachresis 
cannot be invoked, substitution apologists claim that the 
reason for the use of the metaphor is stylistic. 
The substitution view. Black claims, is a special case of 
a more general view about figurative language. This view holds 
that any semantic change is a transformation of literal meaning. 
Thus, instead of providing us with the intended meaning 'm', 
the writer provides us with some function of it f(m), and the 
reader extracts the original meaning by applying the inverse 
function 'f"^' to obtain f~^(f(m)), or m. 
3 H.W. Fowler, Modern English Usage, p.359 
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Expressed thus I think the substitution view looks fairly 
Innocuous, but only at the expense of leaving the Interesting 
and Important questions untouched. It Is not In the least 
Illuminating to be told that In "Richard Is a lion" the focal 
expression "...a lion" Is simply a substitute for "...Is brave" 
It may certainly be true that this Is the sense which the focal 
expression conveys, but the substitution Is certainly not 
licensed by synonomy. (To suggest something like "metaphorical 
synonomy" would obviously get us no further.) What we need Is 
some account of the transformation that Is being carried out; 
the claim that there Is some transformation Is of little help. 
Those theorists who deny the possibility of adequately re-
expresslng metaphorical statements In other terms would 
probably reject the substitution view as question-begging. It 
simply presupposes that there Is some literal equivalent which 
can be substituted for the focal expression. I will argue 
later that metaphorical statements can be re-expressed, but I 
think It Is a claim that needs to be argued and not merely 
assumed. 
The comparison view can be treated as an extension of the 
substitution view In which the characteristic transforming 
function Is specified as similarity. The metaphorical 
expression Is similar or analogous to the literal equivalent, 
and with the frame or wider contextual clues, the reader Is 
able to construct the literal equivalent. This account 
treats metaphor as elliptical simile: thus "electricity Is 
a fluid" means the same as "electricity Is like a fluid". The 
metaphor Implies a comparison that the equivalent simile states. 
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"The main objection against a comparison view". Black says, 
4 
"is that it suffers from a vagueness that borders upon vacuity." 
If we are puzzled by some expression 'M', we are told that it 
stands in place of some literal expression 'L', and that M 
used literally stands for something similar to what L stands 
for. But a bare assertion of similarity is uninformative. The 
vagueness however is not in respect of the claims of the 
comparison view; these can be stated quite precisely. Edward 
Erwin, who has recently argued in support of the comparison 
view, provides a clearer exposition of this theory than Black. 
The comparison view, Erwin says, claims that although it is 
absurd or inappropriate to take a metaphorical statement 
literally, the terms of the metaphorical statement can be taken 
literally as the components of a different statement, "...this 
'different' statement is simply a simile - a statement making 
a literal comparison between two terms" . And when we adopt 
this view: 
...there is no problem about the meaningfulness 
of the statement that is "really" made when we 
speak metaphorically. The statement that is 
"really" made...is a straightforward statement 
making a comparison between two terms. 0 
Erwin does not provide any substantial arguments in favour of 
the comparison view. Instead he attacks Black's interaction 
view, and on refuting this to his satisfaction simply assumes 
the comparison view to be adequate. The logic of this enterprise 
is of course questionable: because the interaction view is 
4 Black, op. cit., p.37 
5 Erwin, The Concept of Meaninglessness, p.113 
6 Ibid., pp.113-114 
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inadequate it will not follow that the comparison view is. But 
since Erwin's principal arguments are presented in connection 
with the interaction view I will postpone further discussion 
of his views until the next chapter. 
The vagueness of the comparison view does not apply, then, 
to the claims of the theory itself, but rather to the claim 
made by a bare assertion of similarity. A metaphorical 
statement does not simply claim that two things are similar, 
it is used to express a particular similarity. In fact we 
shall shortly see that an unqualified statement of similarity 
does not just border on vacuity, as Black states, but is indeed 
vacuous. If we qualify a simile appropriately then we can in 
many cases, though not all, extract the sense of the metaphor. 
This is a common way of 'spelling out' a metaphor, a process 
which I will have more to say about later. The claim 
"electricity is a fluid" acts as a challenge, for the description 
can only be accepted by some modification of our concept of a 
fluid. In general an unfamiliar metaphor presents us with a 
problem to be resolved, and the resolution can very often be 
expressed by a suitably circumscribed comparison. But the 
circumscribed comparison cannot be used as a challenge in the 
same way, even though it expresses the content of the metaphor. 
We shall see in chapter IV that its function is importantly 
different. The fluid metaphor acts as a suggestive model to 
explain certain features of the behaviour of electricity: we 
might liken voltage to pressure and current to flow. But there 
are usually points at which the analogy breaks down. There is. 
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for example, no need to follow Thurber's aunt in fearing that 
an electric socket without a bulb will result in electricity 
"leaking all over the house". Electricity is not a fluid to 
that extent. 
Black also makes the most interesting suggestion that in 
many cases, prior to the use of the metaphor we would have 
difficulty in finding any literal resemblance between the terms. 
He suggests that it may be more accurate to say that the 
metaphor creates similarity than formulates some antecedently 
existing similarity. I am prepared to accept Black's claim 
about creativity, since I think that selecting some point of 
significant similarity from an indefinite and unspecifiable 
range is a creative achievement. 1 shall not at this stage 
provide any clue as to what a 'significant' similarity amounts 
to. But Black's account of the creation of similarity is a 
little misleading. The creative process is not that of 
producing a similarity that did not exist before, but rather 
in selecting the point of similarity from an indefinite range. 
Anything is similar to anything else, if only, as Beardsley 
notes, in that both terms form unit classes'^. This is why a 
bare assertion of similarity is quite uninformative. 
There is also the further point made by Black that the 
comparison view is unable to accommodate a shift in meaning of 
the subject and focal expression, but this will be discussed 
in connection with the interaction view. 
7 Beardsley, op. cit., p.l62 
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The final comment of Black's which I will consider here 
Is the suggestion that a formal comparison effected by the 
simile seems to be subject to precise formulation, whereas 
metaphor Is used In cases where there Is no question of the 
precision of scientific statement: "...as we approach such 
forms [of precise statement] metaphorical statements lose 
o 
their effectiveness and their point" . Perhaps what he has In 
mind here Is that because explicit comparisons are drawn without 
any meaning shift in the component terms, we are usually not 
in any doubt as to how questions concerning the nature and 
extent of the comparison are to be answered. But a literal 
comparison can also be vague, so clarity is not a satisfactory 
criterion to distinguish the literal from the metaphorical. 
Beardsley's discussion of the comparison view is sharper 
than Black's, and his arguments can be developed into an 
extremely damaging case against this theory^. He begins by 
drawing a distinction between "open" and "closed" similes; 
in the former case we are told simply that a is like b, and 
no indication of the basis of the alleged similarity is 
provided. In closed simile, however, the claim is that a is 
like b in respect of P; that is, the claim Includes some 
reference to the basis of the alleged comparison. An open 
simile can never be a satisfactory basis for metaphor, 
Beardsley argues, because no matter what subjects may be 
selected. It will always be possible to find some common 
feature which they have. The claim that two things are 
similar in some respect is empty. On the other hand, the 
8 Black, op. clt., p.37 
9 Beardsley, op. clt., pp.136-138 and pp.l60-l62 
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closed simile will also prove to be unsatisfactory, because 
any attempted reduction of a metaphor to a closed simile will 
be circular. A closed simile, Beardsley claims. In fact 
suggests a metaphor, and It will therefore be quite fruitless 
to attempt to account for metaphor In terms of closed simile. 
The open simile need not detain us. In fact It seems to 
me very doubtful that there Is any such thing In any natural 
context of assertion. The claim that two things are similar 
in some way is too weak to be of any value in ordinary 
discourse, and any apparent cases of open simile will be found 
to be closed within the context in which it occurs. That is, 
the context will always provide some indication of the respect 
in which the comparison is to be drawn. 
According to Beardsley, closed similes can be restated 
"fairly satisfactorily" as metaphors, but not all metaphors 
can be restated as closed similes. This is because not all 
metaphors are Implied comparisons. The argument is somewhat 
elliptical. Taking the line "The moon lies fair upon the 
straits", what, Beardsley asks, is it claimed that the moon is 
like^*^? He apparently believes it is self-evident that no 
satisfactory answer can be given. The problematic metaphorical 
component which he has in mind is presumably "lies upon", 
though we could probably introduce further complications with 
the word "fair". The salient point seems to be that since a 
comparison is relational we need to be able to identify the 
relata. This much we will see also seems to be implicit in the 
interaction view with its talk of primary and subsidiary subjects 
10 Beardsley, op. cit., p.l38 
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or systems. But the Interaction view treats metaphor as 
construing one system in terms of another, rather than as 
an examination of the relations between the two systems. 
Indeed, the latter is probably simply an alternative way of 
stating the comparison view. 
Beardsley's point seems to be that it is not always possible 
to identify the metaphorical component as a relatum. And in 
such cases the comparison view does start to look very lame. 
If the metaphorical expression is a noun-substantive then it 
is possible for the comparison view to gain some credibility. 
It seems to be at least arguable that "man is a wolf" does not 
differ significantly from "man is like a wolf". The comparison 
view begins to look less plausible when we introduce a verbal 
metaphor, such as "the sky is smiling". Perhaps in this case 
a comparison proponent might suggest that what is implied is a 
comparison between the sky and the corresponding noun-
substantive: "the sky is like a smile". When we select an 
adjectival metaphor the comparison apologist should have become 
uncomfortable; what is the comparison implied by "a pregnant 
silence"? At this point the artificiality of constructing a 
suitable noun-substantive for the second term of the comparison 
becomes manifest. It could be suggested that the silence is 
like something pregnant, but this is obviously inferior to the 
original, and not simply as the result of prolixity. By 
suggesting something substantial the rendition has introduced 
irrelevancies. All that is relevant of the metaphor is the 
property of being pregnant, and introducing a substantive term 
will introduce unintended additbnal meanings associated with 
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the substantive term. We might wonder about such Irrelevancles 
as the stage of the pregnancy, or whether the silence will be 
abortive. When we come to Beardsley's chosen example It Is 
difficult to see anything that could reasonably be worked up 
Into the second term of a relation. Beardsley has selected a 
relational verb, "lies upon", as his problematic case, and 
the comparison account must explain the relation between the 
principal subject (the moon) and a relation. 
The argument, which I emphasize Is directed against the 
view that metaphor can be adequately restated as simile, not 
that It Is Impossible to restate It In other language, can 
be presented schematically as follows. If we have a metaphor 
'a Is F' then It Is often possible to change 'Fa' Into the form 
'aRb'. Thus we might suppose that "man Is vulpine" does not 
differ significantly from "man is a wolf". And if we can get 
two plausible substantives then it might be possible to see 
the metaphor as the result of a comparison between them. But 
there are cases where this seems to be impossible, and here the 
comparison view must founder through lack of anything with which 
the subj ect of the statement can be compared. 
The comparison proponent might attempt to counter with the 
claim that the comparison is not between the moon and a relation 
of which it is one of the terms, but between the relation 
between the moon and the straits and the literal sense of "lies 
upon". But this only says there is some sense relation between 
the literal and metaphorical use of an expression, which is 
surely not to be doubted. The point of the comparison view, 
however, was to explain the operation of the metaphor in terms 
of the relation of similarity between the primary and 
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subsidiary subjects, and in this it has not been successful. 
A simple way of expressing this point is that we cannot always 
treat metaphor as the relation between primary and subsidiary 
subjects because we frequently do not have a subsidiary 
subject at all in the required sense. 
Beardsley's second argument is that even if it is 
possible to construe metaphors as similes, it is of no help in 
explaining the metaphor. By similes he means closed similes, 
since as we have already noted anything is similar to anything 
else in some respect. Similes are only effective, he argues. 
Insofar as they entail metaphors, and any attempt to explain 
metaphor in terms of simile would therefore be circular. Thus 
"the wind is as sharp as a knife" gains its effect from the 
implied metaphor "the wind is sharp"^^. I think an objector 
could argue that the comparison has been misconstrued: the 
correct form is "the wind is like a knife in being sharp". 
The term "sharp" is the ground of the comparison rather than 
one of the terms, and is truly predicated of both the wind and 
the knife. But even if "sharp" is the ground, its application 
to the wind Is still metaphorical. The sharpness which is 
being attributed to the wind is not an unspecified sharpness, 
nor is it some general sort of sharpness which can be 
univocally predicated of knives and winds, but a knife-like 
sharpness. To predicate this of the wind, as the comparison 
suggests, must be to apply the term metaphorically. What the 
comparison says is that sharpness is true of both the knife and 
the wind, of the one literally and the other metaphorically. 
11 Beardsley, op. cit., p.l62 
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If we accept this argument we cannot use simile to 
explain metaphor because the meaning of simile already 
presupposes the meaning of metaphor. This, we shall see, does 
not exclude the use of simile in explicating particular 
metaphors. The explicit comparison will be of no help in 
explaining metaphor not because it is by nature inferior 
through being chained to literal language, but because it is 
equally problematic. And we have therefore arrived at Goodman's 
position, that in fact "Instead of metaphor reducing to simile, 
simile reduces to metaphor; or rather, the difference between 
12 simile and metaphor is negligible" 
Neither Goodman nor Beardsley are denying that there are 
literal comparisons. We can, for example, compare objects 
with respect to colour or length or processes with respect to 
duration. But it is in precisely these cases that there is 
no need for metaphor, because we possess adequate means to 
determine reasonably precisely the points of similarity and 
difference. But when we use metaphor, the corresponding 
simile, if it can be produced at all, will derive all its 
force from the metaphor. It cannot assist our understanding 
of it. 
Beardsley's first argument, that not all metaphors are 
implied comparisons, is sufficient to force us to abandon the 
comparison view. The second argument, that a simile gains its 
force from the implied metaphor, has to be interpreted with 
some care. The point of this argument is to show that not all 
the implied comparisons, when they can be found, are literal 
12 Goodman, Languages of Art, p.78 
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comparisons. The wind and the knife are not being compared 
in respect of any property which they literally share. This 
need not amount to a claim of primacy for metaphor over simile, 
but as Goodman suggests, places them on a level: simile will 
not explain metaphor, but neither will metaphor explain simile. 
The comparison view seeks to avoid problems about metaphorical 
meaning, as Erwin states specifically, by replacing metaphor 
by a literal comparison. But the equivalent comparison turns 
out to be not always literal, so exactly the same problems 
arise. We cannot adopt "the equivalent simile" as a simple 
general answer to the question of what a metaphor states. As 
I hinted earlier in this chapter there is an important difference 
in the function of metaphor and simile, though this does not 
prevent a circumscribed comparison being often the means by 
which we explicate particular metaphors. 
To deny the possibility of adopting an equivalent literal 
comparison as a general explanation of metaphor is not to 
despair about the possibility of producing any satisfactory 
account of its operation. I suspect that the failure to find 
any such simple relation between literal and metaphorical 
statements is a reason that has led some writers to treat 
metaphor as a distinct and often superior mode of cognition. 
Metaphor develops a mystique, a transcendent quality which 
places it in a quite different order to the supposedly 
straightforward modes of literal language. But I think it is 
just as important not to charge metaphor with some ineffable 
cognitive power as it is to refrain from treating it as totally 
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devoid of significance. The role of metaphor In language and 
the problem of re-expresslng metaphorical statements will be 
the major themes of chapters IV and V. But before becoming 
involved with these central questions 1 want to examine the 
interaction view suggested by Black. 
C H A P T E R T H R E E 
The I n t e r a c t i o n V iew 
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As an alternative to the comparison and substitution 
views. Black proposes his interaction view of metaphor, 
which in some respects is a refinement of Richards' 
interanimation account. Richards' account refers explicitly 
to an interaction, but he provides us with little information 
about its nature: his observation that the modes of 
interaction may be of "immense variety" is not very 
illuminating. 
In discussing interaction metaphors Black introduces the 
additional terminology of principal and subsidiary subjects. 
The former refers to the subject of the metaphorical statement, 
and the latter to the metaphorical modifier or focal expression, 
These components of a metaphorical statement are also sometimes 
called, respectively, the primary and secondary systems. 
The metaphorical modifier operates. Black claims, 
through a "system of associated commonplaces" which are 
associated with the modifier. These associated commonplaces 
are transferred to the principal subject, and as a result of 
the transfer both components undergo a shift in meaning. The 
important feature of the commonplaces is not that they should 
be true of the focal expression, but that they should be 
readily and freely evoked. Because the commonplaces differ 
from one society to another, an apt metaphor in one may seem 
preposterous in another. For example, the nearest Russian 
'equivalent' that Kosygin's translator could find for the 
English colloquialism "old fruit" translates literally as 
"sunbleached pear". Too much should not be made of this point, 
for although oddities may arise from the idiosyncrasies of 
particular speech communities,a large and important class of 
metaphors are perfectly translatable. 
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Black takes as his main example the statement "man Is 
a wolf". This statement commits the speaker. Black says, to 
some of the accepted platitudes about wolves; a system of 
beliefs not sharply delineated, but sufficiently definite to 
admit some sort of enumeration. Which wolf-like characteristics 
are evoked will depend to a large extent on the principal 
subject. In this case such characteristics as being fur-
covered, carnivorous, and a quadruped, will recede from 
prominence, while other characteristics which can be applied 
to men will come to the fore. The expression will not evoke 
exactly the same characteristics as might the literal use; 
that Is, the wolf has to some extent been humanized. In 
short. Black's claim Is that the metaphorical expression's 
system of commonplaces organizes our view of the principal 
subject of the statement by introducing those wolf-like 
characteristics which can, without strain, be transferred to 
people. These might include. Black suggests, preying on 
other animals, being fierce, hungry, engaged in constant 
struggle, and so on. The subsidiary subject thus selects, 
suppresses, and emphasizes features of the principal subject, 
which in turn exercise control on it. This interaction 
produces a change in meaning of both component expressions. 
Black uses the metaphors "filter" and "screen" to 
describe the interaction, and also claims that the principal 
subject is "projected upon" the field of the subsidiary 
subject. These may suggest that the principal subject under-
goes a passive transformation through the effect of the focal 
expression. However at other points Black claims that the 
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principal subject performs an active role, as when he claims 
that the wolf In "man Is a wolf" is seen to be more human. 
I think that on the whole his account suggests it is the 
active role which he has in mind. 
Although Black talks of commonplaces principally in 
connection with the metaphorical modifier, the principal 
subject also has a set of commonplaces. Both subjects, he 
suggests at one point, are "often best regarded as 'systems 
of things', rather than 'things'"^. This suggests that the 
wolf-commonplaces organize our view of man by acting on the 
commonplaces normally implied by the literal use of the word 
"man". Because Black employs an undifferentiated notion of 
associated commonplaces in his account of change in meaning 
brought about by metaphorical expressions, he is unable to 
account for some of the most crucial features of metaphor. 
Before developing this point 1 want to consider Black's 
answer to a possible objection which he says might be directed 
against the interaction view. Black says it might be claimed 
that: 
some of the "associated commonplaces" themselves 
suffer metaphorical change of meaning in the 
process of transfer from the subsidiary to the 
principal subject. And these changes, if they 
occur, can hardly be explained by the account 
given. The primary metaphor, it might be said, 
has been analysed into a set of subordinate 
metaphors, so the account given is eitherp 
circular or leads to an infinite regress. 
Black says this objection may be countered by denying that all 
changes of meaning in the associated commonplaces are 
metaphorical. Many of these, he says, are better described as 
1 Black, "Metaphor", p.44 
2 Ibid., p.42 
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extensions in meaning. And where the commonplaces do undergo 
a metaphorical shift in meaning, these metaphors are to be 
taken "less emphatically". 1 will argue later that there is 
no reason to worry about using metaphorical statements to 
explicate other metaphorical statements, so 1 do not think 
Black's fears about circularity need to be taken at all 
seriously. Circularity would emerge if his explanation of 
metaphor presupposed this very notion, but this is quite a 
different matter from using metaphor to expound other metaphors, 
which is a procedure which 1 think is perfectly in order. 
The occurrence of metaphor in our explication of 
particular metaphors is not in itself problematic. But the 
attempt to explain particular metaphors through an 
undifferentiated system of associated commonplaces is. The 
difficulty is that almost any expression carries associations 
with it, and in general only a selection from these will be 
appropriate in any particular context, even where the use of 
the expression is not metaphorical. The word "animal", for 
example, carries with it a number of associations, but these are 
not all relevant to its attribution to "man". Black's account 
does not provide us with any clue as to what difference between 
the cases accounts for our taking "man is animal" literally 
and "man is a wolf" metaphorically. Nor does it provide any 
explanation of why the "associated commonplaces" involved in 
metaphor result in a change of meaning. This might be helped by 
a distinction between the standard or central meaning of an 
expression and its marginal or accompanying meanings. 
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Presented thus the problems for the Interaction view are 
different froirij but no less severe, than those faced by the 
comparison view. The Interaction view was proposed by Black 
because the comparison view failed to account for the change 
In meaning produced by metaphor. By attempting to explain 
metaphor as a literal comparison the comparison view amounts 
to a denial of change In the meaning of the component terms. 
But as Black characterizes the Interaction view expressions 
used literally seem also to be able to produce a meaning change. 
So whereas on the comparison view no use of an expression could 
effect a meaning change, on Black's account a literal as well 
as a metaphorical use of an expression may. This consequence 
Is not because Black's presentation Is so far as It goes 
problematic, but because It Is Incomplete. 
Mary Hesse produces an account of metaphor which Is 
essentially modelled on Black's Interaction view. Her account 
at one point suggests the distinction between central and 
associated Ideas which the Interaction view presented by 
Black omits, but she falls to utilize It In her account, and 
In consequence her theory Inherits some of Black's problems. 
Whereas Black considered the Interaction view to be a 
supplement to the comparison theory, Hesse makes the stronger 
claim that It Is Incompatible with It. The essence of the 
comparison view, Hesse claims. Is that the literal descriptions 
of the primary and subsidiary systems, which form the components 
of the metaphor, remain literally true Independently of the 
3 
use of the metaphor . The Interaction view, Hesse argues, must 
reject this claim. 
3 Hesse, "The Explanatory Function of Metaphor", p.252 
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According to Hesse, for a statement to be taken meta-
phorically there must be some obvious inappropriateness in 
taking it literally. Thus since it is obviously inappropriate 
to say man is literally a wolf we must turn to the 
associations or suggestions which the expression "wolf" evokes 
to grasp the meaning of the statement. These were called the 
"associated commonplaces" by Black, and it does seem to be 
necessary to introduce some such notion in order to explain 
the significance of metaphor. But Black's failure to draw 
a distinction between the central and secondary meanings of an 
expression, meant he could not explain what it is that forces 
us to interpret expressions in a particular context 
metaphorically. Hesse says that the total meaning of an 
expression includes features "both linguistic and empirical"^ 
and 1 think this suggests the required distinction. Black 
perhaps thinks that the literal inappropriateness of an 
expression is an obvious requirement for metaphor, and this 
would suggest that the "associated commonplaces" should be 
taken to include only secondary meanings. But the literal 
inappropriateness is, even if obvious, an important requirement 
which needs to be examined in some detail. 
Also 1 think that Black's account suggests, though it 
does not entail, that the system of associated commonplaces 
might be composed of ad hoc accretions. This seems plausible 
for a number of instances, such as the case of the 
colloquialism "old fruit" which I mentioned earlier, but it 
will not do as a general account. The impression is corrected 
4 Ibid., p.250 
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to some extent by the use of the descriptive metaphors 
"filter", "screen", and "projection", which suggest the 
associations are organized, but I think Black's chosen 
example "man is a wolf" is not representative of the large 
class of important metaphors which illuminate the subject 
through secondary meanings which are related in a quite 
systematic fashion. 
Metaphor operates, Hesse says, by transferring the 
associated ideas of the secondary to the primary system. Now 
literal expressions are understood partly in terms of the set 
of ideas associated with the system they describe. These 
associated ideas of the primary system are changed to some 
extent by the use of the metaphor, and the same is true of the 
secondary system, whose associations are affected by its 
assimilation to the primary. The central point of the 
interaction view according to Hesse is that the interaction 
between the primary and secondary systems is carried 
...to the point of invalidating their original 
literal descriptions if these are understood 
in the new, post-metaphoric sense. Men are 
seen to be more like wolves after the wolf-
metaphor is used, and wolves seem to be more 
human 
The comparison account on the other hand is committed to the 
view that the literal descriptions of both systems are and 
remain independent of the use of the metaphor. And this is 
incompatible with Hesse's interaction account. 
5 Ibid., p.252 
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The claim that the components of the metaphor should be 
treated as systems of things rather than things is one which 
needs further examination. This idea, that we are dealing 
with concept-systems is central to the interaction account 
provided by Hesse and Black. But should we treat the meaning 
of "man is a wolf" as the result of an interaction between 
man-beliefs and wolf-beliefs? And has the use of the wolf-
metaphor in fact changed the meaning of the word "man"? 
Erwin believes that the interaction view is mistaken in 
its claim that the use of metaphor results in a shift in 
meaning of the principal subject. A proper evaluation of 
this claim will evidently require some consideration of what 
constitutes a shift in meaning. I have argued in the last 
chapter that Erwin's conclusion that there is no barrier to 
treating metaphor as a literal comparison between its 
component terms is untenable. On the question of paraphrase 
Erwin suggests that there are problems, but that these are the 
result of the scarcity of precise synonyms, and not from any 
particular difficulties with metaphor. Finding an adequate 
paraphrase for a literal expression is just as problematic 
as finding them for metaphors. 
Erwin argues that in the majority of cases there is no 
reason to suppose that the meaning of an expression has 
changed as the result of the use of metaphor. In those 
cases where a change does result this is because the metaphor 
has frozen, and frozen metaphor, he correctly observes, is 
not really a problem for metaphor at all, for in such cases 
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a former metaphor has acquired the status of a literal truth. 
Erwin, then, presents us with the following dilemma: either 
the metaphor results in no change of meaning, in which case 
we can adopt the comparison view; or the meaning does change, 
in which case the metaphor has frozen and no account of 
metaphor is needed. 
Now the change in meaning which attracts Erwin's attention 
is the change in literal meaning which he says the interaction 
view claims to result from our use of metaphor. Such a shift 
in literal sense may occur when metaphor freezes; that is, 
permanently retains the sense it acquires from its use as a 
metaphor; but if it does not retain this metaphorical sense, 
then it is simply false to suppose that there has been a 
change in meaning such as the interaction view suggests. This 
highlights the need to carefully distinguish between two 
aspects of change of meaning. First there is the change in 
meaning which results from our use of metaphor, and secondly 
the changed meaning which an expression acquires in a 
particular context when it is used metaphorically. Apparently 
these changes are not independent. Any resultant change in 
meaning, prima facie, emerges from the sense of the expression 
acquired when it is used metaphorically. Erwin's argument 
is that what we might call the resultant changes do not 
normally occur, and on those occasions where they do, what we 
have is better described not as metaphor, but a new literal 
sense. And further, the meaning of an expression when used as 
a metaphor is adequately explained as a literal comparison. 
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Taking Black's example first, Erwin argues that the 
application of the wolf-metaphor, even with repeated use, 
will not result in changing the literal meaning of the 
expression "man"^. He then goes on to consider an example 
provided by Hesse, "Nature is a machine", and argues as 
follows: 
Let us assume that the term "nature" has changed 
in meaning and that the change has occurred 
because of the extensive use of the "machine" 
metaphor..."nature" means something different at 
times T^ and T^... If someone were to say at time 
T-, that "Nature is a machine".. .we could have 
interpreted the speaker, as the comparison 
analysis suggests, as saying that nature is like 
a machine (in certain respects). 
...if someone were to use this sentence at time 
Tp...he would be saying, literally and truly, that 
"Nature is,^ a machine"... ^ metaphoric analysis 
is needed. 
Erwin denies here that there is, as the interaction view 
suggests, a change (or at least an immediate change) in the 
meaning of the principal subject as the result of the use of 
the metaphor. He therefore thinks that this reason, which led 
Black and Hesse to reject the comparison view, need not be 
accepted. 
Hesse says that nature is seen to be more machine-like 
after the use of the machine metaphor, and that man is seen 
to be more wolf-like after the use of the wolf-metaphor. The 
wolf-metaphor therefore results in a change of meaning of the 
term "man". The way Hesse is able to justify this claim for 
a change in meaning of "man" is by adopting a fairly permissive 
6 Erwin, Meaninglessness, pp.115-116 
7 Ibid., pp.117-118 
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criterion for a change In meaning. "...a shift in meaning 
may result from a change in the set of associated ideas, as 
o 
well as from a change in reference or use." And if we adopt 
this as a workable criterion for change in meaning then I 
think it is perfectly alright to argue for a change in meaning 
of the expression "man". If all that is required is some 
extension in the range of associated ideas then it is very 
likely that a metaphorical attribution will have just such an 
effect. But I can see no reason why, on this view, non-
metaphorical attributions should not equally produce a change 
in meaning. The ideas associated with such notions as man 
can equally be changed or extended as a result of accumulated 
factual knowledge, and indeed it seems likely that a change in 
this sort of sense has occurred in our notion of man from the 
theories suggested by, say, Darwin or Freud. In Hesse's sense, 
a change in meaning of a subject expression is not a 
peculiarity of metaphorical attributions. Erwin offers an 
alternative criterion for a change in meaning, but before 
considering his suggestion there are three points that I want to 
make. 
The first is that for the above reasons I do not think that 
a change in meaning in the sense suggested by Hesse is of 
particular interest to metaphor. Secondly, I think that the 
resultant shift in meaning, even in cases where it is produced 
by a metaphorical attribution, is not as important for an 
account of metaphor as is the metaphorical meaning acquired by 
an expression when used metaphorically. In explaining the sense 
Hesse, op. cit., p.250 
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of metaphor what is Important is the relation between the 
standard or literal meaning of the expression and its sense 
in a non-standard context. How this change is effected is 
of considerable importance whether or not the acquired sense 
is in fact retained and succeeds in supplanting the former 
sense of the expression. I think the interaction view fails 
to attend to the distinction between these aspects of change 
of meaning with sufficient care, and the more important sense 
for metaphor seems to be completely by-passed by Erwin, I 
suspect as a result of his uncritical acceptance of the 
comparison view. The third point 1 want to make is that it is 
simply false to suggest that a satisfactory paraphrase cannot 
be produced because of a change in meaning of the primary 
system. Even if such a change were the inevitable consequence 
of a metaphorical attribution, all that would follow is that 
the paraphrase offered after the use of the metaphor would 
not be the same as any description that may have occurred to 
us prior to the use of the metaphor. If the systems interact 
to the point of invalidating the original literal descriptions, 
as Hesse suggests, it does not follow that we cannot provide 
some new, post-metaphorical literal descriptions. 
It is implicit in the accounts provided by both Hesse and 
Black that metaphor (for Black interaction metaphors) are not 
eliminable. Hesse says that reference to the secondary system 
9 
is not dispensable , which in her terms is a claim that 
metaphor cannot be eliminated, and Black says that paraphrase 
produces cognitive loss^*^, which ultimately comes to the same 
9 Ibid., p.252 
10 Black, op. cit., p.46 
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thing. Both accounts also carry the suggestion that 
accepting the cognitive equivalence of paraphrase commits one 
to the comparison view. I think this is mistaken, although 
the converse is true. 
I suspect also that Black's belief in the ineliminability 
of interaction metaphors was a major reason which led him to 
claim that the apprehension of these metaphors called for a 
"distinctive intellectual operation"^^. This I think is a 
dangerous first step toward treating metaphor as phenomenon 
quite distinct from the sphere of plain language. 
1 have suggested that Hesse's criterion for a change in 
meaning is of no particular help for explaining the change of 
sense associated with metaphor. Erwin offers an alternative 
negative criterion for a change in meaning: 
...a term has not changed in meaning when used 
in two separate statements, if a statement 
containing the term is inconsistent with a 
subsequent statement which contains the same 
term and is^the apparent denial of the original 
statement. 
Using this criterion, Erwin proceeds to show that the wolf-
metaphor has not succeeded in changing the meaning of "man". 
For, he argues: 
If Black had said prior to 1954, "All men must 
die", and if he, or any other employer of the 
wolf-metaphor, were now to say, "Not all men 
must die", would not the second statement be 
inconsistent with the first? If so, would this 
not show that^the meaning of the term "man" had 
not changed? 
Erwin's criterion is that if we take two contrary predicates 
and find that applying them to what appears to be the same 
11 Black, op. cit., p.46 
12 Erwin, op. cit., p.ll6 
13 Ibid., p.117 
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subject at different times produces inconsistency then this 
is sufficient to establish that the subject has not changed 
l4 
in meaning. I think this is a very tough criterion . If 
we allow that any pair of contradictory predicates may be 
selected 1 think it will be difficult to find any changes of 
meaning in Hesse's sense. Hesse would allow that our notion 
of man can alter without affecting the true attribution of 
mortality. Erwin, if 1 understand him correctly, is 
suggesting that the continuing truth of "all men must die" 
is sufficient to show that the expression "man" has not changed 
in meaning. Now certainly if we considered that "all men 
must die" were true at one time and "not all men must die" were 
true at another, and also that both claims were consistent, and 
that further "...must die" was univocal, then I think we would 
have to concede that "man" had changed in meaning. Hesse and 
Black 1 think would accept the sufficiency of this condition, 
but would almost certainly argue that it is not a necessary 
condition. Erwin appears to place no restriction on which 
statement and its denial might be selected as a test for any 
subject. And by selecting some statement about man which 
expresses something fairly central to our understanding of this 
notion (such as the fact of his mortality) we can ensure the 
conclusion that the meaning of this expression has not changed, 
no matter what literal or metaphorical attributions might be 
made. That is, even for a subject that has prima facie 
undergone a fairly substantial change in meaning, 1 think it 
would be always possible to find some statement whose 
affirmation and denial before and after the change produced 
an inconsistency. 
l4 The criterion bears a close resemblance to Quine's criterion 
for ambiguity (Word and Object, p.128) which, interestingly, 
Erwin rejected earlier as too strong (Meaninglessness» P-55ff.) 
46 
Hesse's criterion, on the other hand, that a change in 
some associated idea is sufficient to produce a change in 
meaning makes change in meaning extremely easy. I can see no 
simple way of weakening Erwin's criterion by placing 
restrictions on what statements may be admitted as allowing 
change in meaning which would be useful for our present 
purposes. The dispute in any case seems to be about changes 
in literal meaning, which concerns, 1 have suggested, changes 
resultant from the use of metaphor. And 1 have already 
suggested that this is of less importance than the sense 
relation between an expression used metaphorically and its 
standard literal meaning. 
If Hesse had strengthened her criterion by using the 
distinction between central and peripheral meanings she may 
have been able to provide a more illuminating account. We 
have seen also that Black's interaction account is incomplete 
because it takes no account of the distinction between central 
or standard meanings of an expression, and secondary meanings, 
variously called the peripheral, marginal or accompanying 
meanings. This leaves him unable to account for what it is 
that forces us, in a particular context, to interpret an 
expression metaphorically. A distinction along these lines I 
have suggested is further necessary if we are to make any 
progress in understanding what relation there is between the 
standard meaning of a term and its meaning when used 
metaphorically, which I have suggested is the change in meaning 
which is important for an explanation of metaphor. Monroe 
Beardsley draws this distinction very clearly. 
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Beardsley calls the central meaning of an expression 
15 
its designation, and the secondary meanings its connotations 
The designation is the standard core meaning of the word, and 
the sort of thing one would expect to find entered in a 
dictionary. What a word connotes are the characteristics which 
it does not designate but that are widely thought or said to 
belong to the things which it denotes^^. These characteristics 
form a range of connotation, and what the word connotes in a 
particular context will be a selection from its total range. 
The total range may even include incompatible connotations. 
The distinction, Beardsley claims, may not be sharp, but it is 
operative in all our ordinary speech. Mary McCloskey appears 
to have the same sort of distinction in mind when she speaks of 
17 
the logical and psychological aspects of a term . This account 
is a considerable improvement on Black's "associated commonplaces" 
because it explains quite simply what it is about a word which 
forces us in a particular case to take it as a metaphor. In 
some cases the context Indicates that an expression cannot be 
taken literally, that is, the designation of the word is seen 
to be absurd or inappropriate. When this occurs it is to the 
connotations that we must turn to make sense of the expression. 
Which connotations are relevant will depend on the context, the 
most important feature of which is, of course, the principal 
subject. This account will explain Black's comments on the 
15 Beardsley, op. cit., p.125 ff. 
16 "Denotation" is used rather loosely here and is better 
reserved for the relation between name and object. I shall 
follow Beardsley and use "designation" as the relation 
between word and object or concept, and deliberately refrain 
from characterizing these notions any further. 
17 McCloskey, "Metaphors", p.230 
humanizing of the wolf-system. The wolf Is humanized because 
the principal subject determines which wolf-commonplaces are 
relevant. Metaphor operates by selecting connotations from 
the total range, and the selection is necessary because of the 
inappropriateness of applying the central meaning or designation 
of the word. Beardsley calls his theory the Controversion 
Theory because the normal literal sense of an expression is 
controverted by the context, and this forces us to turn to the 
secondary meanings to determine its meaning in that context. 
In Black's example, because the term "wolf" cannot be 
literally predicated of man, it gains its effect by 
activating wolf-connotations. (This is a good reason to follow 
Black and Hesse in treating the secondary subject of the 
metaphor as a system of concepts rather than as a single one.) 
Exploring the range of connotations is the process of 'spelling 
out' the metaphor, and this will be considered further in the 
next chapter. 
There is a relativistic problem which arises in connection 
with the range of connotations of a word. Because the 
connotations can to some extent be made up of personal 
associations, the success of the metaphor will to that extent 
be unavoidably dependent on individual idiosyncrasies. It looks 
as if the 'correct' interpretation of a metaphor will admit no 
objective answer. Further, even in the apparently unlikely 
event of exact agreement being reached as to the range of 
connotations, there remains scope for real dispute as to which 
connotations within the context were intended by the speaker. 
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The answer to the first question pointed to by Beardsley Is 
that the designation of the term Is relatively stable for any 
18 
given speech community . A thorough examination of this 
problem lies beyond the scope of the present enquiry, although 
I shall return to It briefly In the next chapter. The second 
problem also raises formidable questions. I will say no more 
at this stage than that the Intended meaning Is usually 
perfectly clear, which Is to say that most metaphors are 
transparent. And the discovery that on occasions a metaphor 
can be extended further or In different directions to that 
Intended by the speaker seems to be a source of considerable 
richness of this mode of expression. 
The essential point of Beardsley's account of metaphor, 
and one which Is taken up by McCloskey, Is that the literal 
sense of the word Is rejected by the context, and that this 
results In the sense being taken up by the connotations. 
Another major virtue of Beardsley's account Is that It 
provides a simple and elegant account of how metaphor freezes. 
Failure to distinguish between fresh and frozen metaphor has 
dangerous consequences which will be taken up later. On 
Beardsley's account a metaphor freezes when one or more of Its 
former connotations become fixed as Its new designation. Once 
again this Is difficult to fix with precision, but the 
beginning and end points of the process can be fairly readily 
Identified. Because It has been made a defining feature of 
metaphor that the designation of the expression must be contra-
indicated, it can be readily seen that a frozen metaphor is not 
l8 Beardsley, op. cit., p.131 ff. 
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really metaphor at all. The new designation may include the 
former designation, in which case the metaphor has generalized 
the sense of the expression, or it may yield a sense which is 
quite distinct from the original. 
Beardsley's controversion theory can be considered a 
refinement of Black's interaction view, though I am not 
suggesting that it derives historically from Black's theory. 
It patches up a major weakness in Black's theory by suggesting 
why some expressions must be taken metaphorically, and provides 
an account of the relation between the literal and metaphorical 
sense of an expression. 1 argued that a "system of associated 
commonplaces" could equally be responsible for the sense of a 
literal attribution, which suggests there is some incompleteness 
in Black's account. Hesse's account suggests there is a 
distinction between central and peripheral meanings, but did 
not exploit this difference in her account of metaphorical 
meaning. As I said before, I think this is because her account 
concentrates on the changes of meaning which result from the 
use of metaphor rather than the actual meaning of an expression 
used metaphorically. And in any case the changes which Hesse 
suggests result from the use of metaphor can equally be the 
result of a literal attribution. 
Beardsley corrects both these weaknesses. It is 
contextual controversion that forces us to abandon a literal 
reading of the expression, and it is to the connotations we 
then turn to determine the meaning of the expression. The 
main difficulty in Beardsley's account lies, I think, in his 
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treatment of the connotations. He believes that In literal 
use these lie dormant, and the contextual controversion forces 
them to our attention. Beardsley's suggestion Is that 
metaphorical meaning Is already present, albeit latently. In 
the expression prior to Its use metaphorically and the use In 
a particular context simply "brings them to llfe"^^. 
The claim that the connotations of an expression are 
present prior to Its use suggests that It would be possible 
to determine In advance what limits exist for the term's 
metaphorical application. This 1 think would Involve a denial 
of the creativity of metaphor which I argued for earlier In 
the chapter. I agree with Beardsley that the creativity 
Involves a selection of some sort, but 1 do not think that it 
is possible to specify, prior to the use of the metaphor, a 
limit within which the selection is made, as Beardsley's 
20 account of the connotations suggests . Black's intuitions 
21 about metaphor "creating" similarity , and his claim that a 
? ? 
paraphrase falls to provide the Insight that the metaphor did 
are, I believe, perfectly sound, and my reasons for supporting 
these claims of Black against the results which emerge from 
Beardsley's account will become clear in the next chapter. 
Given the background use of an expression together with 
its occurrence in a particular context it is usually possible 
to determine whether it is to be taken literally or metaphorically 
And the test of whether or not an expression is to 
19 Ibid., p.143 
20 The claim that metaphor involves selection will be 
subject to Important qualification in the next chapter. 
21 Black, op. cit., p.37 
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be taken metaphorically Is the simple one: is it for any 
reason inappropriate to take the expression literally within 
that context? An affirmative answer will not distinguish 
between a metaphorical statement and an 'absurd' one. We 
need the further test: is it revealing? Does it assist our 
understanding of the situation? This is, of necessity, rather 
loose; although we can provide some reasons for inappropriateness, 
appropriateness is something which looks impossible to account 
for by any blanket criterion. All we can do is settle 
individual cases through discussion and agreement. For what 
could be a criterion for what we find interesting or useful? 
Without the background use and the context it is not 
possible to legislate on whether a given statement is 
metaphorical or absurd. And this is why with sufficient 
ingenuity it is usually possible to provide an apparently 
absurd statement with some sort of metaphorical sense. But these 
contextual contortions do nothing to refute the fact that 
particular statements in particular contexts are absurd. If 
this is countered with the claim that the openness of actual 
contexts, or as Beardsley would say the range of connotations, 
allows enough leeway to admit any sentence as meaningful, I 
would observe simply that our patience is not without limits. 
Salvaging nonsense may become a curiously compulsive interest, 
but it is of no particular assistance to the understanding. 
Beardsley, we shall see, falls into the error of supposing 
that the sense of metaphor exists prior to its use, and it is 
instructive to compare his mistake with Black's. Whereas Black 
saw that the creativity of metaphor cannot be readily explained 
53 
on an account which claims that it is possible to re-express 
metaphor in other terms, and suggested that therefore it 
required "a distinctive intellectual operation" to be grasped, 
Beardsley instead denies the creativity of metaphor. He 
proposes instead that the meaning is already present, albeit 
latently, in the connotations, and the use of the metaphorical 
expression simply "brings them to life". 
Metaphor provides us with insights that cannot be provided 
by literal expressions, but it remains true that they can be 
restated without cognitive loss in non-metaphorical terms. 
This paradoxical statement will be one of the themes of the 
next chapter. 
C H A P T E R F O U R 
The E x p l i c a t i o n o f Metaphor 
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In this chapter I propose to examine the question: can 
what is said metaphorically be said literally? What are we to 
make of the claim that "...metaphorical language can be 
translated without significant loss into other language"^? 
The first point to be considered is whether it is 
important that the paraphrase might contain other metaphorical 
expressions. This will depend on what we regard as the 
purpose of the paraphrase. Substituting one expression for 
another is no end in itself, and in this case the purpose is 
to clarify or explicate an unclear expression. If the 
assumption is made that literal language is clear whereas 
metaphorical language is obscure, there will be some 
justification for attempting to provide strictly literal 
paraphrases for metaphorical expressions. But this assumption 
is extremely dubious. Without attempting to provide an 
answer to the contentious claim that all metaphors are obscure, 
it is quite apparent that literal language is not always clear. 
There is no good reason to substitute one equally obscure 
expression for another, literal or metaphorical, so if there 
is any purpose for paraphrase it must arise from the 
requirements of semantic clarity rather than from the 
intrinsic nature of the literal and the metaphorical. 
In fact it will eventually emerge that obscurity is no 
more a condition of metaphorical expressions than clarity is 
of literal expressions, and further, that the conditions which 
determine the meaningfulness of expressions are much the same 
for the literal and the metaphorical. 
1 Henderson, "Metaphorical Thinking", p.9 
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The most important purpose for providing a paraphrase for 
an expression, literal or metaphorical, is to clarify or 
spell out its meaning. A paraphrase purports to present an 
expression or set of expressions which explicate what the 
original expression means. It might be argued that a 
paraphrase may succeed in revealing the ground of the metaphor, 
that is, the means by which it expresses its meaning, but 
that the precise meaning of the metaphor is something which 
eludes capture. The idea of some meaning which transcends 
the so-called ground of the metaphor is one which is by no 
means clear. The meaning of the metaphor is not some 
disembodied entity but simply ^ the ground, though this will 
need a little qualification. A pragmatic test which is 
frequently used to determine whether an intended meaning has 
been grasped, is to demand a roughly equivalent restatement 
of the sentence or expression. In fact this seems to be the 
kernel of the notion of explanation: how do we reformulate 
the unfamiliar expression in terms of other more familiar 
expressions? To admit that this is not possible is 
tantamount to denying that explanation is possible at all. 
And that which transcends all possibility of explanation 
leaves us with the uneasy feeling that it may not be really 
intelligible. The question of paraphrase seems to come down 
to the question of whether metaphors are intelligible in 
terms of our ordinary precepts of understanding. It is only 
as a last and desperate resort that a distinctive mode of 
apprehension for understanding metaphor should be introduced. 
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It seems to me that this desperate step has been taken because 
any paraphrase seems grossly inferior to the original 
metaphor, and from the failure to clearly distinguish between 
fresh and frozen metaphor. 
Although I think the possibility of producing a 
paraphrase is a condition of intelligibility of a metaphorical 
expression, it does not follow that the paraphrase is equivalent 
to it in all respects. To begin with we can never be sure that 
the paraphrase exhausts all the interpretations that can be 
given. But to the extent that the metaphor has been understood, 
a paraphrase can be provided. 
A second and more important reason for resisting the 
idea of exact equivalence between metaphor and paraphrase is 
the change in meaning which may be Introduced by the metaphor. 
There is an illusion of equivalence which results from our 
tendency to take an after-the-fact view of metaphor. It is 
easy to suppose that the meaning of the metaphor was already 
present in the expression prior to its use as metaphor, 
but this is true in only a trivial sense. Metaphor is not an 
alternative way of expressing common sense, but a common way 
of achieving new sense. Once metaphor is seen as a perfectly 
ordinary process through which new meanings are generated 
much of the mystery which frequently surrounds it evaporates. 
This shift of meaning must not be confused with the 
freezing of metaphor, though the processes are related. A 
frozen metaphor results from a permanent shift of meaning, 
and for this reason should not be considered as metaphor at 
all. It is only when we are aware of an alternative meaning 
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that we can be aware of a shift In meaning. Talk of the 
"tension" or "life" of a metaphor, and making It a feature of 
genuine metaphor. Is simply a way of ruling so-called frozen 
metaphors out of the discussion. It Is only when we are 
aware of an apparent Incompatablllty between the old and new 
senses that we can be aware of tension In the use of an 
expression. 
Making this awareness a requirement of genuine metaphor 
enables us to avoid a serious blunder which emerges from a 
number of discussions which fall to rule out frozen metaphor. 
The danger of treating frozen metaphor as real metaphor Is 
that virtually every expression In any language comes to be 
seen as a metaphor. Plagued by this ubiquity, these accounts 
see language as a whole to be Infected with metaphor, and 
metaphor destroys Itself. For In such a prevailing climate 
of semantic anarchy, words become too plastic to support stable 
meanings, and the very possibility of description and analysis 
dissolves with language as a whole. It Is only against the 
background of stable meanings that the possibility of metaphor 
can arise, and whether we choose to call these literal or 
frozen metaphors Is of little Importance. It Is dangerously 
misleading to talk of metaphor as a primitive phase of 
language development preceding the refinements of logical and 
precise descriptive thought. In such a language, if it ever 
2 
existed , the possibility of metaphor could not arise. Though 
we may agree with Barfleld that philologists have had "the 
2 See Erich Fromm, The Forgotten Language 
58 
vivid hallucination of metaphor bending over the cradle of 
meaning"^, I would conclude with Stanford that: "Dead 
4 metaphors tell no tales, except to the etymologist" . 
The awareness requirement has the effect of introducing 
relativity into the notion of metaphor, and this might be 
thought to be undesirable. An expression may be a metaphor 
for A, but not for B, or it may change from metaphor to non-
metaphor (and perhaps back again) for A at different times. 
This does not seem to me to be a very serious consequence, for 
though individual idiosyncrasies can affect our understanding of 
the meaning of an expression, there is a stabilizing effect 
provided by the members of any given speech community which will 
tend to establish, though not generally explicitly, bounds 
within which the expression will have a correct literal use. 
The existence of such a community is necessary to provide 
stabilities of meaning by establishing precedents for the 
correct and incorrect uses of an expression, and these 
stabilities are in turn a precondition for metaphor. 
Metaphors are usually not misunderstood because they are 
used deliberately, and seen to be used deliberately. It is 
important to realise that expressions, literal or metaphorical, 
are chosen to serve the purpose of communication rather than 
to obscure it. In fact the desire for clarity and precision 
is a powerful factor in our use of metaphor and our choice of 
particular metaphors. There are idiosyncratic uses of 
expressions, the choice of a metaphor which capitalizes on some 
3 Owen Barfield, Poetic Diction, p.88 
4 W. Bedell Stanford, Greek Metaphor, p.85 
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knowledge or experience which lies outside the ambit of the 
audience, and the use of such an expression will normally 
demand clarification. Misunderstandings will from time to 
time occur, and their correction is a constant and on-going 
process. Looked at broadly, we can view literal meaning as 
the result of a constant process of stabilization. Thus 
although making awareness a necessary condition for the use 
of metaphor suggests that the notion is relative, this is not 
a serious consequence because of the stabilizing of meaning 
which occurs within any speech community. 
The fact that metaphors are in most cases chosen and 
understood to convey some fairly explicit idea explains why 
the common use of metaphor goes largely unnoticed. Because 
the meaning is usually quite evident we do not pause to 
consider alternative recondite interpretations that might be 
attributed to the metaphorical statement. That we are on 
occasions deceived or misled, and sometimes by this alerted 
to the occurrence of metaphor, in no way tells against the 
fact that by and large the meaning of ordinary discourse, and 
the metaphors it contains, is quite apparent. To say that 
metaphors frequently pass unnoticed is not to claim that their 
use is not deliberate or unconscious, but simply that they are 
selected and grasped with the same facility with which we 
handle literal expressions. The literal-metaphorical 
distinction is not apparent simply because meaning is usually 
clear. This is the feature of common metaphor, which 1 earlier 
called its transparency, and it should not be confused with 
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frozen metaphor, for if we attend, to the expression it can 
be unmistakably perceived to be metaphorical. However, in 
many cases it perhaps does represent an intermediate stage 
between fresh and frozen metaphor. 
In this chapter I will argue, with some qualifications, 
that it is possible to re-express metaphorical statements in 
other terms. But if this is the case it might be wondered 
why we use metaphor at all. If there is even the possibility 
that a metaphorical statement might be misleading, it would 
surely be more prudent to adopt the apparently more perspicuous 
expressions of literal discourse. One consideration which 
governs our choice and use of metaphor is undoubtedly 
stylistic. The metaphorical expression is often chosen to 
avoid the tedious and flat prose style to which discourse can 
and does descend. I see no reason to give credence to the 
view that clarity and precision of expression demand the most 
colourless and drab terms available. And if, as I hope to 
establish, the meaning of metaphorical statements is not a 
hopelessly mysterious or obscure matter, then there will be 
no reason to adopt a policy of deliberately avoiding this 
mode of expression. 
A second reason which leads to the widespread use of 
metaphor is that a well chosen metaphorical term often 
achieves economy of expression which cannot be matched by a 
more circumlocutory literal statement. Whether or not 
economy alone carries any cognitive advantage is perhaps open 
to question. It could be argued that if it is possible to 
provide an equivalent paraphrase then the metaphor has not 
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expressed anything that could not be equally well captured 
by other means. But even if this claim is disputed there is 
an undeniable pragmatic advantage in adopting condensation 
of expression which can be achieved by metaphorical expressions. 
The painstaking avoidance of all but the most explicit and 
prolix mode of discourse can often be a burden to the sense 
it is attempting to convey. It is significant to note here that 
condensation is frequently used as a test for comprehension. 
There is a third and more important reason to recognize 
the importance of metaphor in discourse, which accords to it 
significant cognitive achievements and this will form the 
substance of the present chapter. Although I will argue that 
we can paraphrase the sense conveyed by the metaphorical 
statement, in many cases this would not be possible prior to 
the use of the metaphorical expression. There is a trivial 
sense in which this is true, for of course if a metaphorical 
expression has not been used, there can be no question of 
providing a paraphrase of it. The claim is rather that in 
many cases the sense conveyed by the metaphorical statement 
could not be otherwise expressed in non-metaphorical language 
prior to the use of the metaphorical expression, though after 
the statement has been grasped such explication is possible. 
Although the paraphrase expresses the insight conveyed by the 
metaphorical expression it fails to provide it, but this is 
difficult to see after the insight has already been provided. 
It is our tendency to take an after-the-fact view of metaphor 
which lures us into thinking that metaphor simply draws our 
attention to something which was evident prior to its use. 
62 
The use of metaphor is a process through which new sense 
is achieved, and the sense which has been achieved can be 
expressed in other terms. When metaphor is viewed as such a 
process, it can been seen to be neither some utterly 
inexplicable or mystical mode of insight, nor simply false 
or seriously misleading, nor just a colourful restatement of 
plain sense. In arguing toward this conclusion I will follow 
Donald Schon, whose account of the process of metaphor, I 
think contains some important insights into this phenomenon^. 
Schon sets out to provide an account of the emergence of 
new concepts. He identifies two prevalent approaches in 
dealing with conceptual novelty. On the one hand there is the 
reductionist approach which dismisses novelty as an illusion. 
According to this view apparently new concepts are to be 
explained as variations on old ones, or alternative ways of 
expressing concepts which we already possess. The problem 
of explaining novelty is thus avoided by the expedient of 
denying that there is really anything to be explained. The 
other dominant approach is to treat the emergence of new 
concepts as a mysterious phenomenon for which no explanation 
can be given. Thus on the one hand we find a tendency to 
deny the existence of disruptive novelty, and on the other 
to revere it as being a matter of vital importance but 
transcending explanation. The burden of Schon's account is to 
establish that conceptual novelty is both real and can be 
explained. New concepts are indeed derived from old, but 
they cannot be reduced to the old in the way the reductionist 
5 Donald Schon, The Displacement of Concepts 
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theorists suggest. The dichotomy of theories of mystery 
versus theories of reduction has historical antecedents 
reaching back to early Greek philosophy, and forms a leitmotif 
of theories of novelty right up to the present. 
Right at the beginning Schon explicitly draws attention 
to the intimate relationship between his account of the 
emergence of conceptual novelty and the phenomenon of metaphor: 
"In at least one of its senses, the process of metaphor is 
nothing more or less than my displacement of concepts"^. 
An important type of situation in which metaphor is 
commonly used is that in which there is some element which is 
baffling or perplexing: some feature of the situation becomes 
manifest which our existing conceptual apparatus is unable to 
accommodate. In such a case it is common for a metaphorical 
7 
expression to be preferred as a description or explanation . 
Any situation whatsoever contains aspects of novelty, but in 
descriptions which proceed in accordance with our established 
canons of classification we attend only to the old and 
familiar. We selectively attend to those aspects which are 
easily recognizable as instances of concepts with which we are 
familiar, and deliberately ignore disruptive novelty. This 
familiar concept-instance model is the pattern which our 
ordinary literal descriptions follow, but it is applicable only 
at the expense of ignoring aspects of the situation, which is 
6 Ibid., p.ix 
7 I do not think we can sharply separate the notions of 
description and explanation. This is a consequence of 
the fact that a concept-in-use is theory-laden. 
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always new in its here-and-now particularity. Each concrete 
instance of a concept differs from every other in some 
respects, but description can proceed only through attention 
to similarities. In identifying some aspect of the situation 
as an instance of a familiar concept nothing significantly 
new can emerge. A problem arises however when the situation 
embodies some feature which cannot be readily ignored, but 
which cannot be assimilated as an instance of the concepts 
with which we are familiar. In these cases where our 
familiar modes of categorization break down, we are forced to 
amend or extend some concept; in Schon's terminology, meaning 
undergoes "displacement". A metaphorical expression is 
characterized in Schon's terminology as one whose meaning can 
be seen to have been displaced. 
The extension of meaning which the metaphor effects is not 
simply an increase in the number of things to which the term 
can be applied. The essential feature of metaphor is that the 
term is applied to a new type of thing. We need some account 
of what is to count as a type of instance; it would obviously 
be circular to attempt to explain it in terms of the 
achievement of metaphor. In order to clarify the idea of a 
concept embracing a new type of instance, I will consider one 
of the examples presented by Schon. He writes: 
...when I found myself in a metal room with a 
thin metal wall that reverberated whenever it 
was jarred, it was a new thought to me that 
the room was a kind of drum. 
I shall assume that the metaphorical statement which is being 
Schon, op. cit., p.30 
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considered here Is "the room is a drum". Schon does not 
mistake the room for a drum. He is still able to identify 
those objects to which the word "drum" can be correctly 
applied, for he already knows about "snare, bongo, bass, and 
Q 
oil drums"^. I shall disregard the latter sense for the 
moment since it is apparently an ambiguous sense of "drum". 
But we shall shortly see that this sense can be explained in 
terms of a metaphorical extension of meaning of the word. 
It is relatively easy to see what the room has in common 
with the other drums Schon has mentioned. In fact in the 
course of introducing the example Schon has revealed the ground 
of the metaphor. The room, like snare, bongo, and bass drums, 
is a hollow container, covered by an elastic membrane which 
reverberates noisily when struck. If we adopted this 
characterization as the definition of a drum, then the room 
would quite unmistakably and literally be a drum. 
But prior to the description of the room as a drum it 
is most unlikely that we would have adopted this as our definition, 
The ordinary notion of a drum possesses other features which 
would exclude the room as a possible instance. And this of 
course is the reason that the use of this word to describe the 
room must be taken metaphorically. Snare, bongo, and bass 
drums are all musical instruments, and fall within some fairly 
definite, though not precisely specifiable, range of physical 
dimensions. These are features which we expect to find 
associated with drums, though they are certainly not shared by 
the room. The room is not a musical instrument, and it may be 
9 Ibid., p.30 
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surprising to find oneself actually inside a "drum". The 
metaphorical sense of "drum" which emerges here depends on 
the fact that it has been applied to the room. This much 
was claimed by the interaction view. But the metaphorical 
statement "the room is a drum" does not, as the interaction 
view suggests, go any way toward invalidating our former 
descriptions of rooms. (I shall ignore the possible exception 
"the room is not a drum" which one might feel inclined to 
accept prior to the use of the metaphorical statement: this 
is obviously a highly artificial case.) The subject of the 
metaphorical statement exercises control on the metaphorical 
modifier, and the modifier changes our view of the subject by 
introducing a novel description. But the metaphorical 
modifier does not, as the interaction view suggests, change 
our notion of what it is to be a room, except in the sense 
that we now have an additional way in which they can be 
described. It is now possible to sort rooms into those which 
are "drums" and those which are not. But this will have no 
effect on the criteria we use to identify instances of the 
concept "room". By introducing the possibility of sorting 
rooms in a new way we do not change our Idea of what rooms 
can be. The position here is no different from introducing 
a classification according to literal predicates which we may 
not have thought to apply. There may of course be difficulties 
in deciding whether or not to apply the term "room" to 
particular cases, but this is a consequence of the "open-
texture"^'^ of the term, and has nothing to do with metaphor. 
10 See Waismann, "Veriflability" 
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Although the metaphorical statement has not changed our 
notion of rooms, it has of course changed our notion of this 
room. It comes to be assimilated to the class (which may be 
novel) of rooms which reverberate noisily when struck. But 
coming to look at it in this way does not differ in principle 
from assimilating it to the class of rooms which are painted 
white or air-conditioned. The sort of change the metaphorical 
modifier effects by introducing a novel perspective is not 
different from our more habitual sortings, though simply 
because the perspective is novel it is presumably more striking. 
Turning from the subject of the statement to the 
metaphorical modifier, it is possible to discern an important 
difference between saying "the room is a drum" and "the room 
is like a drum". By introducing a suitably circumscribed 
comparison it may be possible to express the meaning of the 
metaphorical statement, though this will need a little 
qualification. I have already argued that this will not be 
true of all metaphorical statements, but in this case the 
simile suggests a way of revealing the ground, that is, a way 
of paraphrasing the metaphorical statement. But whereas the 
comparison can never result in changing the meaning of "drum" -
comparing the room in such and such respects does not change 
our notion of drums - seeing the room as a kind of drum can. 
This can be expressed by saying that the use of a comparison 
does not result in any displacement of sense. By changing the 
sense of the word "drum" in its use as a metaphorical 
description the possibility arises that the new sense of the 
modifier may freeze and become the literal truth, but when the 
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locution "like" is used this cannot happen. A comparison 
cannot introduce anything significantly new because the 
comparison only qualifies, and does not change, our 
existing concepts. Metaphor stretches the concept to apply 
to the new instance, and this may eventually result in a 
permanent change in the concept. The sense of "drum" which 
emerges here would have been excluded in terms of the 
previous criteria for the application of the expression, which, 
after the metaphorical use of the expression, are amenable 
to suitable modification so as to include the new instance. 
1 do not know of any criteria to determine what is to count as 
"suitable modification". It could be added that the 
characteristics which serve as the ground on which the shift 
in sense is based should be non-trivial, but this is not 
much help. The room and the drum share a number of 
characteristics, such as both being physical objects, which 
would not count as a satisfactory ground for the metaphor. 
What we are prepared to admit as significant or illuminating 
metaphor can only be settled by agreement following the 
examination of individual cases. 
1 do not believe that Schon's example has resulted in 
changing our notion of "drum". Our concepts are not so 
volatile. The notion of drum used in the example remains tied 
to the bongos and snares, and the foregoing is intended only 
to indicate how a new sense of "drum" could emerge through 
regular metaphorical use in this and comparable statements. 
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The notion of a drum can also be extended in other 
directions. If we suppose that the original sense of the 
expression was something like: "a noise-producing membrane-
covered cylindrical musical instrument", metaphorical 
extension can be produced by attending to other prominent 
features. Thus "oil drum" and other "container" drums may 
develop from the cylindrical container feature, "ear drum" 
from the elastic membrane feature, and so forth. By this 
sort of metaphorical extension of the meaning of "drum" in 
different directions we can see how a word can develop a set 
of referents which share what Wittgenstein has called a 
"family resemblance"^^. The relationship between "family 
resemblance" and metaphorical extensions of a word could 
probably be fruitfully explored further. 
1 have said that the sense of "the room is a drum" can 
be adequately expressed by a suitably circumscribed comparison. 
This makes it look as though metaphor is Indeed elliptical 
simile in this case, and 1 want now to qualify this claim. 1 
think the way Schon introduced this example belies his theory, 
and displays some features of the "after-the-fact" views 
that he is anxious to refute. Schon said that he found himself 
in a room with a thin metal wall which reverberated when 
jarred, and the thought then occurred to him that the room was 
a kind of drum. Presented thus, Schon seems to have simply 
perceived a number of points of similarity between the room 
and a drum, and from this constructed the metaphor. And 
11 Wittgenstein, Investigations, Section 66 ff. 
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expressed thus the comparison view appears to be quite 
plausible. I think, however, it is more likely that an 
unusual feature of the room, probably its producing a noise 
when struck, suggested to him the description "drum", and it 
was during the course of considering this description that he 
discovered that the room possessed other drum-like properties: 
being a hollow container covered by an elastic membrane. (The 
story may be empirically false, but I think the argument 
requires only that it reflects a common way of examining novel 
situations.) The point is that the metaphorical description 
was most probably initially applied to the room without full 
realization of what features of the room it covered. The 
metaphor was first offered as a tentative description of the 
room, which provided the basis for developing an explanation 
of some unusual aspects of its behaviour. After the statement 
has been explored it is possible to legislate on to what 
extent the room is a drum, and in this process of investigation, 
or spelling out the metaphor, we are providing a paraphrase, 
which may take the form of a comparison between certain 
features of rooms and drums. And after the metaphor has been 
explored it is difficult to avoid reading the results of the 
investigation back onto the situation as features of the room 
which were obvious before the metaphor was applied. But 
without the metaphor as the framework to structure the situation 
in this way, a number of features of the room which Schon draws 
our attention to would almost certainly have been unnoticed. 
But even if they had been noticed in isolation, which is most 
unlikely, they would have lacked the systematic ordering 
provided by the metaphorical modifier. Though the sense of the 
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metaphorical statement can be reproduced by a paraphrase, 
the paraphrase cannot structure the situation in the way in 
which the metaphorical expression does. This is the reason 
that the paraphrase "fails to provide the insight which the 
12 
metaphor did" . Schon does in fact stress most of these 
points, and my criticism concerns his example rather than the 
underlying theory. As he presents it, the example lends itself 
too readily to an after-the-fact interpretation, which is one 
of the principal sources of error of a number of accounts of 
metaphor. 
The use of simile cannot serve as a model explanation in 
this way. Disregarding open simile, which I have already 
argued is uselessly weak, the closed simile, by drawing our 
attention to various points of similarity, is an end-point of 
an enquiry rather than the beginning. But metaphor serves as 
the starting point for analysis. A metaphor calls for 
explanation, and in the process of examining it we develop a 
paraphrase, which is simply a statement of how far it can be 
extended. The further it can be taken, the richer the 
metaphor. Whereas simile provides an answer about the relation 
between two terms, metaphor poses the question. I think this 
is the point Stanford has in mind when he suggests that simile 
and metaphor are not generically related at all, simile being 
analytic and metaphor synthetic^^. The frequent use of 
(closed) simile to explicate metaphor perhaps reflects this 
difference in function. 
12 Black, op. cit., p.46 
13 Stanford, Greek Metaphor, p.28 ff. 
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In coming to understand a metaphorical statement we 
engage In a process of exploration; we look to see how far 
the metaphor can be extended, that Is, how many aspects of 
the subject the metaphorical modifier can structure Intelligibly. 
This process Is one of seeing how much that Is familiar In 
the modifier can be retained, as well as how much novelty In 
the subject can be revealed. This exploration, the 'spelling 
out' of the metaphor. Is nothing more than providing a 
paraphrase. In coming to understand the metaphor, we proceed 
by expressing the Insight which the metaphor provided In other 
language. Whether or not this re-expresslon Involves the use 
of other metaphors Is not a matter of great Importance. The 
purpose of the paraphrase Is to explicate the sense of the 
metaphorical statement, and there can be no objection to the use 
of metaphorical statements whose meaning Is clear to do this. 
That Is, it is quite permissible at least to use transparent 
metaphor. The use of metaphors which themselves stand in 
need of explication will, however, compound the problem, and 
it is desirable to avoid these instances. Schon addresses 
himself to this point with the claim that: 
At best, the literal-metaphorical distinction 
is a distinction in function; for a given 
metaphor, the literal^^anguage is...what is 
used to spell it out. 
This statement seems to go dangerously close to dissolving 
the literal-metaphorical distinction altogether, for it suggests 
that any component of the paraphrase is to be taken as literal. 
However, I think that all we need ask is that the paraphrase 
be perspicuous, and this does not exclude the use of further 
metaphorical statements, though it will of course exclude some 
l4 Schon, op. cit., p.57 
73 
metaphorical statements. This is a reiteration of the claim 
made at the beginning of the chapter, that explication and 
paraphrase emerge from the requirements of semantic clarity 
rather than from the distinction between the literal and the 
metaphorical. In the case of metaphor, pace Quine, 
explication is not elimination. 
The reason for providing a paraphrase of a metaphorical 
statement is the same as the reason for providing a 
paraphrase or explication of any statement whatever: something 
about it is obscure which we would like clarified. But 
metaphor is unclear not because we are unfamiliar with the 
meaning of the metaphorical component, but just because we 
are familiar with its meaning, which in the context does not 
readily fit. But if the metaphor is a good one with some 
modification it can be made to fit, and we come to understand 
the situation as we come to understand the extent to which it 
does fit, that is, the extent to which the new situation 
differs from and is similar to the situations from which the 
metaphorical modifier was derived. The metaphorical 
modifier can thus be seen as a model, programme, or framework 
through which the situation is explored, and the meaning of the 
metaphorical statement is the result of the exploration which 
the modifier suggests. The process is one which demands our 
active participation, and in coming to understand the 
metaphorical statement we understand those features of the 
situation which the modifier structures. Insofar as these 
features are grasped at all they can be described, and so the 
metaphor, so far as it has been understood at all, can be 
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paraphrased. In claiming that the majority of cases of 
metaphor are transparent I am simply saying that the 
modifier, though clearly metaphorical, has a widely accepted 
or self-evident interpretation. 
Schon's discussion of the after-the-fact view throws 
light on the nature of structured concept systems which have 
featured in most of the accounts of metaphor which I have 
discussed. The reason that the modifier is able to structure 
or provide a perspective'for a particular situation is a 
consequence of the fact that language contains no isolated 
concepts. Concepts in use are related, albeit loosely, to 
other concepts, that is, they are theory-laden. This feature 
of language has already been alluded to: it is what underlies 
Beardsley's "connotations". Black's and Hesse's "systems of 
things", and McCloskey's "concept clusters", "peripheral 
characteristics", and "psychological aspects". Most of these 
theories attest to the fact that our concepts are loosely tied 
togefchier, and explicitly employ this feature to explain the 
achievements of metaphor. Expressed form.ally, the metaphorical 
expression has associated with it a set of predicates from 
which we extract the sense of the metaphorical statement. And 
1 would maintain that in articulating the range of predicates 
which the metaphor introduces, we produce a paraphrase of the 
metaphorical statement. 
15 
Schon also talks of "concept clusters" but his 
treatment differs in an important respect from these theories. 
The talk of "connotations", "commonplaces", "peripheral 
15 Ibid., p.54 ff. 
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characteristics", or whatever, being carried, over to the 
novel situation by the metaphorical modifier reveals that 
an after-the-fact view has been taken. Schon suggests that 
If we are to understand the operation of the metaphorical 
modifier we should treat the associated predicates rather as 
a set of expectations^^. It Is only after examining the 
situation In terms of these expectations, that Is, 
determining whether they are fulfilled or not, that we are 
able to decide which of the predicates can be applied. The 
associations which give sense to the metaphorical statement 
are not something carried over passively, but are the result 
of our exploration and discovery. The Interaction and 
controversion views suggest that the associated commonplaces 
or connotations are manifest prior to the use of the metaphor; 
but In many cases this occurs only after the metaphor Is 
used. It Is through the exploration we engage In In coming to 
understand the metaphor that these "associated" predicates 
become actual associations. It Is more accurate to say that the 
metaphorical use of the expression actually brings the 
association Into being. It Is once again our reading the sense 
achieved by the metaphorical statement back onto the beginning 
of the process which enables us to suppose that the association 
In question was present from the start. Again, we can speak 
of It as having been present In the trivial sense in which a 
metaphor must have some ground, but the selective and active 
process of drawing It to our attention Is a genuinely creative 
achievement. 
16 Ibid., p.58 ff. 
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Treating the associations from the point of view of a set 
of expectations reveals an important way in which a well-
chosen metaphor can achieve considerable economy in explanation, 
Not only does the metaphorical modifier provide a programme 
or model for investigating the subject, but by simply 
remembering the metaphorical statement we can avoid burdening 
ourselves with all the aspects of the subject which the 
metaphor has drawn to our attention. For the 
series of expectations... need not be remembered 
since they can be generated again. They 
[metaphors] have the condensation essential to 
instruments of thought. 
To illustrate the tendency to regard the displacement of 
sense which results from the use of the metaphorical 
modifier as having been present prior to the use of the 
modifier, Schon considers a fairly typical account of metaphor 
provided by Roger Brown. Brown writes: 
Sometime in the past someone or other noticed 
that the foot of a man bears the same relation 
to his body as does the base of the mountain 
to the whole mountain. He thought of extending 
the word foot to the mountain's base. The word 
foot then referred to two categories. These 
categories share a relational attribute which 
makes them one category. Within this super-
ordinate category, which we might name the 
foundations or lower parts of things, there are 
two subordinate categories - the man's foot and the 
mountain's base. These two remain distinct within 
the larger category because the members of each 
subordinate category share attributes that are not 
shared with the members of the other subordinate 
category... Metaphor differs from other 
superordinate-subordinate relations in that t^g 
superordinate is not given a name of its own. 
17 Ibid., p.60 
18 Brown, Words and Things, p.l40 
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Schon comments: 
For him [Brown] a metaphor calls to mind two 
categories of reference and points to an 
attribute they share - here, 'the foundations 
or lower parts of things'. He sees a metaphor 
as nothing more than a way of identifying two 
categories as subspecies of a common genus. 
The only difference is that in metaphor the 
genus, or superordinate, 'is not given a name 
of its own'. But he does not see in metaphor the 
emergence of a new concept nor does he see that 
the concept or the superordinat e., may come into 
being only through the metaphor. ^ 
The objection that is liable to be levelled against Schon 
here is that the similarity, in this case the unnamed super-
ordinate category, must have existed prior to the use of the 
metaphor, or the metaphor would have no basis. The answer to 
this objection by now should be apparent. All that exists 
prior to the use of the metaphor is an unperceived similarity. 
But postulating a previously unperceived similarity as the 
basis of metaphor is quite empty , for we can accord cognitive 
significance only to similarities of which we are aware. 
Admitting the ubiquity of unnoticed similarities explains 
nothing, and simply transforms the problem into why a particular 
similarity was drawn to our attention. There seems to be 
little difference between talking of creating similarity and of 
becoming aware of it. The emptiness of open simile which we 
noted earlier is simply a consequence of the spuriousness of 
the similarities of which we are not aware. 
The temptation to Invoke unperceived similarities here has 
a twofold source. First there is the seductiveness of the 
after-the-fact view: after a concept has been extended it is 
difficult to resist believing that the extension was obvious. 
19 Schon, op. cit., pp.36-37 
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And secondly, by Introducing an unnamed superordinate category. 
It Is possible to understand the metaphorical displacement in 
terms of the familiar concept-instance model. Of course if 
the displaced sense of the metaphorical expression becomes the 
standard sense, that is, if the metaphor freezes, then a 
concept-instance account is perfectly legitimate. But we have 
already seen that frozen metaphor is not genuine metaphor at all, 
and so the concept-instance account can only be invoked in 
precisely those cases where no account of metaphor is needed. 
The history of science affords us many striking 
examples of the "obviousness" of certain features of our 
surroundings which, once noticed, seem virtually impossible to 
have ever been overlooked. The typical reaction is nicely 
summed up by T.H. Huxley's response to Darwin's theory of 
evolution: "How extremely stupid not to have thought of that". 
The importance of metaphor in scientific explanation, amply 
attested to by Hesse and others, is simply a consequence of 
the fact that through metaphor we bring the familiar to bear 
on the unfamiliar. The new, if it is new, is not just an 
instance of our existing concepts, but it must be understood 
through an intelligible adaption of our existing concepts, for 
we have nothing else with which to come to grips with it. 
There is one point of disagreement with Schon's account 
which I should mention. By addressing himself to the question 
of whether or not metaphor can be eliminated his account is 
threatened with trouble from metaphor's ubiquity. By considering 
the slightly different question of whether metaphor can be 
explicated these problems can be avoided. The difference is 
that in explicating metaphor there is, on my account, no objection 
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to the use of other metaphors provided their meaning is clear, 
that is, provided we choose those cases which I have 
characterized as 'transparent'. And this only amounts to 
pursuing the apparently reasonable course of demanding 
explanation only where explanation is needed. But I do not 
consider this point of disagreement to be major, and on the 
whole I endorse Schon's account. 
In particular, I believe that his pathology of the 
prevailing accounts of metaphor, isolating the principal error 
as our tendency to take an after-the-fact view, and believe the 
results of metaphor were obvious prior to its use, provides 
an important contribution to our understanding of the process 
and how it comes to play a central role in concept formation. 
C H A P T E R F I V E 
The Prob lem o f P a r a p h r a s e 
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In this chapter I will consider some objections which 
have been raised against the possibility of paraphrasing a 
metaphorical statement. Scepticism about producing a 
reformulation of a metaphorical statement In other terms has 
been expressed by a number of writers. Charles L. Stevenson 
writes, "There Is no such thing as giving an exact translation 
of a metaphor Into non-metaphorical terms''^. Stanford claims 
"the finest type of metaphor transcends the expllcltness of 
2 paraphrase" and that "efforts to explain them are just queer 
o perverted compliments to their Influence" . According to Black 
"The literal paraphrase Inevitably says too much - and with the 
4 
wrong emphasis" . Philip Wheelwright claims that metaphor 
Involves a kind of knowing which Is "paralogical" and that a 
paraphrase Invariably loses the "feel" and "presentlal reality" 
1 will not multiply the examples further. There Is a common 
argument which underlies these claims, expressed by Henderson 
as follows: 
The chances are...that an Interpretation, giving 
the tenor of a metaphor, will always be too 
exact, too sharp, however many sentences it may 
contain. The suggestlveness of a metaphorical 
expression, on the other hand. Is subject to no 
fixed rules... So no sentence or series of 
sentences can hope to coincide In megnlng with 
what the metaphor-sentence suggests. 
Stevenson claims that the metaphorical statement suggests 
7 
more than It descriptively means . The argument proceeds as 
follows: 
1 Stevenson, Ethics and Language, p. 
2 Stanford, Greek Metaphor, p.29 
3 Ibid., p.58 
4 Black, "Metaphor", p.46 
5 Wheelwright, The Burning Fountain, p.56 ff. 
6 Henderson, "Metaphorical Thinking", p.10 
7 Stevenson, op. cit., p.74 
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Only if direct language had exactly those effects 
on the hearer or reader which the metaphorical 
language has, could it be said to convey precisely 
what the metaphor suggests. In that event it would 
have to convey a referential meaning, certain 
implications of that referential meaning, certain 
attitudes, say the speaker's or writer's confidence 
in his subject matter, deference towards his 
audience, and so on. An interpretation in direct 
language wilj certainly not 'convey' all of these 
suggestions. 
But, Henderson counters, a paraphrase can certainly convey 
some of these suggestions, and it will have a better chance if 
it attends to only some aspects of the full suggestiveness of 
the statement. I think this claim can be strengthened. It is 
possible to convey any of the suggestions mentioned above in 
direct language. If we notice, say, that the speaker conveys 
a particular attitude toward his audience it must be possible 
to state what this attitude is. The problem really arises with 
the "and so on"; the argument really rests on the claim that 
the restatement is always incomplete because of the aspects of 
the statement which have been overlooked. There is this sense, 
then, in which the paraphrase is unavoidably partial. But 
here I would follow Wittgenstein and claim that the assertion 
that our understanding is partial only makes sense if we are 
aware of an alternative Interpretation. And if we become aware 
of an alternative Interpretation, we are able either to extend 
g the paraphrase or provide a competing one . 
Wittgenstein's argument concerns the notion of "seeing 
as...", and there are significant parallels between visual 
perception and metaphor. The important parallel here is that 
8 Henderson, op. cit., p.10 
9 Wittgenstein, Investigations, Part II, xi 
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just as seeing Involves Interpretation, so does the understanding 
of an expression, metaphorical or not. For non-transparent 
metaphors the Interpretation must be supplied consciously^*^. I 
shall come back to the notion of "seeing as..." later In the 
chapter. 
We cannot treat the meaning of a metaphorical statement 
as the totality of possible Interpretations. The totality Is 
spurious because It Is Impossible to know In advance just what 
extensions or alternative meanings might be provided for any 
metaphorical statement. The claim Is only that Insofar as the 
statement has been understood at all. It Is possible to provide 
a paraphrase. 
There Is another point that should be noted In connection 
with Stevenson's arguments. As Stevenson himself observes, 
suggestlveness manifests Itself In statements which we would be 
reluctant to treat as metaphorical. Thus "four-score and seven 
years ago" may have a different Impact on a hearer to "eighty-
seven years ago", though It Is not entirely clear what the 
former rendition expresses which the second falls to capture. 
We might attempt to describe what Is lost through such 
metaphors as "feeling" or "tone", but all attempts of which I 
am aware to describe this loss are disappointingly vague. My 
principal concern however Is with the cognitive aspects and 
achievements of metaphor, and It seems that these are not only 
amenable to paraphrase: they demand It. That In many cases the 
paraphrase Is Immediately grasped; that Is, Is not and need not 
10 Wittgenstein explicitly notes there Is a parallel between 
visual perception and meaning. He writes, "And I can see 
It [a cipher] In various aspects according to the fiction 
I surround It with. And here there Is a close kinship with 
'experiencing the meaning of a word'". 
(Investigations, Part II, xl, p.210) 
83 
be explicitly articulated, in no way tells against the 
argument. The possibility of paraphrase is the condition of 
intelligibility of cognitively significant metaphor. 
It is of course open to the hearer to reject a paraphrase 
as inadequate. But the bare statement that the paraphrase 
simply ^ unsatisfactory is extremely lame. The proponent of 
the paraphrase might reasonably ask why the paraphrase is 
unsatisfactory, and if no reason is forthcoming there is no 
reason why he should not stick to it. The disagreement in such 
a case cannot be resolved, for there are no grounds on which an 
argument can proceed. The dogmatic stance of blank rejection 
cannot be answered, but since it provides no reason why it 
should be accepted it can be safely ignored. But to adopt such 
a position is unusual, and the objector will more commonly 
provide some reason for rejecting the paraphrase as partial 
or mistaken. And when the criticism is offered with some 
backing it can no longer be ignored. But in the course of 
presenting his reasons, the objector is revealing ways in which 
the paraphrase can be corrected or extended. Far from telling 
against the possibility of paraphrase, in engaging in any 
substantive act of rejecting the one which has been offered, 
the objector is participating in the enterprise of providing 
one. This is very frequently a part of the process of 'spelling 
out' a metaphorical statement, which is the process by which 
we come to understand non-trivial metaphor. In practice, 
agreement on a satisfactory explication is usually reached 
very quickly. 
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I think the claim "If a metaphor needs explaining It Is 
a bad one"^^ needs a little qualification. If It Is Intended 
to convey that metaphors should be selected In the Interests 
of clarity rather than obscurity, there can be no objection to 
It. But If It Is intended to suggest the clarity must be 
present from the start I think It Is mistaken. Very often 
explanation and exploration is demanded, though as we have seen 
after this has been done the result may seem 'obvious'. 
Transparent metaphor does not need explaining simply because 
the explanation is evident, frequently as the result of earlier 
exploration, and therefore does not need to be repeated 
explicitly. Part of the economy of metaphor derives from the 
fact that explicit explication is unnecessary. 
In support of his view that metaphors are untranslatable, 
12 
Stevenson takes the example "The world's a stage" . After 
providing several perfectly reasonable paraphrases of the 
statement, he goes on to say nevertheless there is a wealth 
of suggestive meaning which the paraphrase is unable to capture. 
Again I think that unless Stevenson is able to say what it 
fails to capture we can dismiss the charge at least in respect 
of cognitive meaning. And non-cognitive meaning is an 
enormously suspect notion which I do not propose to consider. 
There is a problem with aphoristic statements such as this 
because they can be used in a vast number of different contexts, 
and in changing the context we can to some extent change the 
meaning. However, what the statement expresses in any 
particular context, such as when it was used by Hamlet, can be 
11 McCloskey, "Metaphors", p.223 
12 Stevenson, op. cit., p.74 
85 
determined and fairly readily reexpressed, though not perhaps 
as elegantly or economically. Here as elsewhere understanding 
Involves Interpretation, and an interpretation can be stated 
explicitly. 
Aphorisms are aphorisms because they have the sort of 
generality which makes them appropriate to a number of 
different contexts, and in different contexts amenable to 
different interpretations. But their occurrence in a particular 
context at least limits the alternatives, and usually effectively 
Indicates a single, specifiable interpretation. To say that 
they have a wide range of alternative meanings is to claim 
that we can envisage their meaningful occurrences in a large 
number of different concrete contexts. But without some actual 
context it is impossible to know what the meaning might be, 
though this does not matter since without the context the 
expression is of little interest. Speculating on alternative 
meaning commonly proceeds by setting up a number of different 
contexts in which the statement might reasonably occur. And 
if the statement achieves such generality that no context is 
called to mind, its meaning becomes attenuated, and aphorism 
degenerates into clich'e. 
Aphorisms and related statements do not, then, constitute 
a serious problem for the paraphrase programme. But opposition 
to paraphrase is proposed from a variety of pretexts. 
Martin Foss argues that metaphor plays a unique and irreducible 
role in our thinking, and his account suggests that any use of 
metaphor is beyond the possibility of paraphrase . A number of 
13 Poss, Symbol and Metaphor 
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writers in contrast, while accepting paraphrase for the 
simpler cases, refuse to admit that the more vital forms can 
be subjected to restatement. This Is perhaps the most common 
position, and Is the approach taken by Black and Stanford, for 
example. The line of demarcation between metaphors which can 
be paraphrased and those which cannot has been variously and 
usually vaguely drawn, and to consider the different suggestions 
would Involve embarking on an enormous task of cataloguing. I 
shall consider only a class of metaphors which Is popularly 
cited by opponents to the paraphrase programme: the synaesthetlc 
or Intersensory metaphors, which are those cases which Involve 
the alienation of sense modalities. It Is argued that while 
perhaps a satisfactory paraphrase might be possible for a 
number of metaphorical statements, the recalcitrant synaesthetlc 
class at least will not submit to restatement In more direct 
language. Brown, for example, writes: 
Richard Is a lion because he manifests courage, 
majesty, strength, pride, and the like. But a 
voice Is cold because It Is cold. A single 
attribute links the referents and that attribute 
Is Itself one of the referents. This leaves us 
unable to talk about the sensory i^ |sls of the 
metaphor In any Illuminating way. 
Brown Is suggesting that we are unable to add anything to 
explain what Is conveyed by the coldness of a voice. The 
metaphorical modifier here Is final: apart from offering 
equally problematic synonyms nothing further can be said. We 
might say that here we have reached a limiting case, where the 
modifier simply is the ground. In the application of "foot" 
to a mountain. Brown argued that we can explain the sense of the 
l4 Brown, Words and Things, p.149 
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metaphorical statement through the notion of a superordlnate 
category, but there Is no possibility of a comparable 
explanation here, for there Is no category which can be 
Invoked to span both temperature and the quality of a voice. 
Synaesthetlc metaphors are extremely common In poetry; 
Dante's "silent sun", Milton's "blind hands", and Swinburne's 
"blind lips" are all cases In point. The presence of this 
class of metaphors in poetic forms is perhaps an important 
reason why it is in this sphere that paraphrase encounters 
its gravest difficulties, and also its most hostile resistance. 
A thorough examination of the problems encountered here would 
involve going a long way into the field of aesthetics, and my 
treatment here will necessarily be extremely sketchy. 
A point to note at the beginning is that "cold voice" is 
not a fresh metaphor, and we would probably have little 
hesitation in using it to describe particular voices. We have 
developed a precedent-class for the application of the term, 
which has at least partially severed it from the notion of 
temperature from which it was initially derived. And the 
Independent criterion for its application is a sign that an 
ambiguous sense has been developed. This really obscures the 
problem. What we want to know is how this sense was developed. 
How do we go about exploring the sense of a synaesthetlc 
metaphor when it is first used or encountered? Is there any 
ground which we attend to and might articulate through which 
our understanding of the metaphor proceeds? A negative answer 
is suggested by Ernest Gombrich^^. 
15 Ernest Gombrich, "Physiognomic Perception", in 
Meditations on a Hobby Horse 
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Gombrlch claims that some of our responses to our 
surroundings are basic and carry Immediate conviction. These 
he calls physiognomic perceptions. Physiognomy usually relates 
to facial characteristics, but Gombrlch has In mind a more 
general sense relating to any Immediate reaction we experience 
when confronted by some aspect of our surroundings. "Immediate" 
simply means that the awareness Is such that we are not conscious 
of Interpretation or of reading signs In any way. Our reactions, 
Gombrlch claims, testify to the constant scrutiny with which we 
scan our surroundings with the vital question: are you friendly 
or hostile, a 'good thing' or a 'bad thing'? The suggestion Is 
that the basis for at least some metaphors Is not the result 
of shifting an expression from one category to another, but a 
spontaneous choice of a more basic categorization than the 
tight meshes of our literal language would allow. Ernst 
Casslrer^^ has argued toward a similar conclusion, claiming 
that In some cases the metaphor does not so much establish 
new connections as re-establish old ones which have been 
severed or obscured through the complexity and refinements 
produced In the course of our conceptual development. Stanford^'^ 
adopts a comparable position, claiming that synaesthetlc 
metaphors awaken some aboriginal response, and our grasp of 
them reflects the ancient and Integrated perception of our 
surroundings. The poet does not create something new, but 
recreates the old and lost unified view of the world 
which existed "when humanity was young, and language was 
18 still green and pliant" , and for which we have an Instinctive 
16 Casslrer, Language and Myth 
17 Stanford, op. clt., p.56 ff. 
18 Ibid., p.58 
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empathy. On this view the notion of displaced sense is 
replaced by that of re-discovered sense, reflecting a primaeval 
and unified view of the world, which encompasses aspects of the 
world which our specialized and developed categorizations 
have taught us to treat as disparate. Gombrich points out that 
an infant does not have to be told that a lullaby is soporific 
or that bright colours are more cheerful than dull ones. This 
simply reflects the immediate reactions of a pre-conceptual 
stage of development. 
It may be true that our use and understanding of 
synaesthetic metaphors presupposes some preconceptual response 
to particular stimuli, but the account is of no help in 
explaining the meaning of the statement which results from the 
present use, which depends on the word's position in our 
received and refined conceptual apparatus. Primitive unified 
perception could not explain for example any shades of meaning 
which might result from the selection of the term from one sense 
modality rather than another, for there could be no such 
distinction. The account is much too general to be of any 
help in explaining particular cases which are bound to remain 
mystifyingly vague. Goodman rejects the account, for although 
in some cases the metaphorical expression may be reclaiming 
some range of application which it has since vacated: 
The reapplication is nevertheless metaphorical; 
for what is literal is set by present practice 
rather than by ancient history... however 
illuminating it may be...it obviously does not 
explain the metaphorical applications of all or 
even most terms. 
19 Goodman, Languages of Art, p.77 
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As I have presented it, the account was not intended to 
explain the metaphorical use of all terms; only the 
synaesthetlc cases. The theory tells us that since 
synaesthetic metaphors depend on basic preconceptual responses, 
no paraphrase is possible, because the paraphrase involves 
analysis in terms of our existing concepts. But although no 
paraphrase is possible, since our grasp is immediate, none is 
required. 
I think the difference suggested by Gombrich between an 
immediate or basic response and a mediate or interpretive one, 
can be illuminated with the notion of "seeing as...". It is 
no accident that the physiognomic account was developed to 
explain synaesthetic cases, which are concerned with basic 
perceptual responses. It makes no sense to say that I see this 
colour patch a^ yellow because judgments of simple colour 
qualities are minimally interpretive. The colour concepts, 
like other basic perceptual responses,differ from the majority 
of our concepts in that, unlike descriptive terras such as 
"drum", they are not structured. Since these judgments 
involve no interpretation there is no possibility of an 
alternative interpretation. Wittgenstein suggests that our 
perception of 'simple' objects such as a fork also involves no 
interpretation; it makes no sense, he argues, to speak of 
20 
seeing it ^ a fork , but I think this is quite wrong. Here we 
do have an interpretive element, and hence the possibility that 
the object might be interpreted differently: we might well see 
it as an egg-beater, as a less-than-adequate comb, or 
20 Wittgenstein, op. cit., p.195 
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topologlcally as a ctenoid. Each of these possibilities 
associates It with a different set of items. The locution 
"seeing as..." is strange because it suggests we are aware of 
an alternative interpretation. In describing the majority of 
the items with which we are familiar we are not aware of an 
alternative interpretation, but this is because none occurs to 
us, not because none can be given. We just 'see' forks, 
drums and typewriters in a way which seems just as natural as 
the way we see yellow. The interpretation is so habitual 
that it takes considerable effort to see that it is there at 
all. 
The main claim of the physiognomic account is that the 
grasp of some metaphors is immediate and has and needs no 
explanation. But if one fails to grasp it there is no way in 
the world in which it can be explained. There are no means 
whatever of exploring or coming to understand synaesthetic 
cases, for with the possible exception of useless synonyms we 
are unable to provide an indication in any other terms of 
what the statement conveys. This seems to me just empirically 
false. Synaesthetic metaphors do convey something, and any 
number of attempts to re-express what is conveyed, principally 
from the field of literary criticism, could be cited. They 
may also, like any statement, generate in the listener or 
reader some non-cognitive response. The means whereby we 
analyse and come to understand them, we shall see, are not the 
same ones that we employ in all cases, but analyse and come to 
understand them we do. To gainsay this would be to reduce 
them to the status of a purely phatlc collocation. 
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Synaesthetic metaphors no less than any others are used to 
organize or structure experience, though the means whereby the 
organization Is carried out Is not the same as that which we 
encountered In the "foot" and "drum" cases. The description 
of a voice as cold Is a way of classifying It, and 
classification Invariably has cognitive Implications. It Is 
Important to resist the Idea of a dichotomy allowing on the 
one hand cognitive metaphor which operates through the 
dispassionate structuring of objectively quantifiable features 
of experience, and on the other purely poetic metaphor which 
operates through some kind of Immediate, non-cognltlve 
suggestlveness. The conviction that the distinction between 
science and poetry Is the distinction between knowing and 
feeling, the cognitive and the emotive, has led to mistaken 
theories In science and aesthetics. Rather, as Goodman argues, 
21 
In aesthetic experience the emotions function cognltlvely 
The consequence Is that since all metaphors are descriptions, 
and all descriptions aid the understanding by sorting and 
discriminating various aspects of our experience, metaphorical 
descriptions function cognltlvely. Irrespective of whether 
they arise from basic perceptual or emotive responses or from 
refined and organized structural features of experience. Like 
all metaphors, synaesthetic cases can be explored, modified 
and developed, they are adjuncts to cognition, and operate by 
discrimination, sorting, and classification. And as with other 
cases, what has been understood can be restated. 
21 Goodman, op. cit., Ch.VI 
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Understanding is achieved through exploration, and this 
I have argued may be 'spelled out' to produce a paraphrase. 
Exploration involves classification, and unless there is 
classification, and hence the possibility of misclassification, 
the metaphor could tell us nothing; and in conveying no 
information it would become indeed mere noise. The paraphrase 
is the statement of the principle of classification, and 
classification is at least a necessary condition for cognition. 
Nonsense begins where paraphrase ceases. 
I have suggested that the difference between synaesthetic 
and structural metaphors is not one that can be expressed by 
saying that one has a structuring function that the other lacks. 
We cannot separate them by a dichotomy between cognitive and 
non-cognitive metaphor; both are cognitive, and both are 
therefore subject to paraphrase. 
But there remains a problem to be resolved in the case of 
these basic perceptual metaphors. In the "drum" and "foot" 
cases which I considered earlier, the modifiers seem to operate 
by interpreting the subject in a manner which draws our 
attention to some structural features of the subject; or more 
accurately, structural features emerged through the use of 
these modifiers. In these cases, it is possible to redefine 
"foot" or "drum" in such a way as to allow mountains and drums 
respectively to be included as undisputed Instances of these 
terms. But it is clear that we could not develop a sense of 
"cold" that could be univocally applied to material objects 
and voices. 
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Synaesthetic metaphors do classify their subjects, but 
the end result cannot be a displacement of sense in the way 
this can result from other modifiers. What we achieve is 
discontinuity rather than displacement. This is the most 
that is shown by Brown's point about the lack of some univocal 
sense of "cold" emerging which can be univocally applied to 
voices and physical objects. Synaesthetic metaphors differ 
from other metaphors in that their use cannot result in an 
extension of meaning, but only in ambiguity. This is a 
reflection of the fact that they perform their structuring 
not by getting us to cross classification boundaries, but by 
getting us to transpose our responses from one sense modality 
to another. This results in a reorganization which can be 
paraphrased, but not in one that will lead to a displacement 
in meaning. If this is true, then if the sense of "cold" 
encountered here (I hesitate to say it) freezes, it will result 
in ambiguity rather than generalization of sense. 
Synaesthetic metaphors depend on aspects of the situation 
which cannot be subjected to the same procedures of exploration 
and refinement which can be used in the structural cases. 
Although the refinement which can be applied in structural 
cases cannot be applied here, the perceptual and emotive 
features of the situation are nevertheless phenomenologically 
objective. To suppose that our means of sorting and 
categorizing depends on aspects of the situation which can be 
defined with precision, is to take too narrow a view of our 
conceptual armoury. Although there is no scale on which the 
emotive aspects of a situation can be quantified or measured, 
the classification in terms of these aspects is nevertheless a 
contribution to our understanding of it. 
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Here it is mistaken to demand the existence of a precise 
paraphrase. No absolute precision in the paraphrase can be 
achieved here simply because none is presented in the 
statement. If the statement is understood to convey something 
simple and precise, the paraphrase will be simple and precise. 
If, as often happens in synaesthetic cases, they are rich 
and suggestive, then the paraphrases may be rich and suggestive. 
Vagueness can be clearly perceived. We can sharpen the meaning 
in some cases at the expense of sacrificing generality. As 
with a microscopic examination, the resolution on a particular 
part may be increased at the expense of losing sight of more 
and more of the whole. (The analogy is Imperfect in a number 
of respects. ) 
In synaesthetic metaphor there are no 'logical' or 
'obvious' stopping points for the explication because of the 
indefinite gradations of our feelings; indeed, it is probably 
a mistake to speak here of gradations or sharp divisions at 
all. Feelings cannot be quantified in the way in which some 
other aspects of our surroundings can be, which is possibly 
what Richards had in mind when he remarked that there could be 
no such thing as a "poetic thermometer". The problems here 
derive ultimately, I am suggesting, from the naive pre-
supposition that whatever has meaning has a precise meaning. If 
this assumption is rejected then the denial of precision will 
not reduce or elevate synaesthetic metaphors to a pre-cognitive 
or to a supra-cognitive mode. 
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I do not want to deny the existence of undifferentiated 
emotion or pre-conceptual responses, but simply to claim that 
they are never sufficient to explain our understanding of 
metaphor. Metaphor is something which ^ understood, and this 
alone is enough to reject any view that relegates it wholly to 
the level of a pre-conceptual response. It is also true that 
what gives rise to synaesthetic cases may be such a pre-
conceptual response, and to this extent Gombrich could well be 
right. Their occurrence may well be the result of some 
primitive reaction, but primitive reactions alone do not 
produce metaphors, and neither do they explain them. (We 
understand the metaphor without actually directly experiencing 
whatever feeling may have given rise to it.) Metaphor is 
significant whether or not it is the result of some primitive 
reaction; the metaphor is still cognitive, and the cognitive 
aspects of any statement whatever are amenable to paraphrase. 
In view of the above it should be possible for me to now 
say something about what is conveyed by the description of a 
voice as "cold". First, being sensory, we can abandon the 
idea of a precise scale of degrees celsius. We might suggest, 
for example, that it conveys the idea of being uninviting and 
unemotional. This is not precise, but I have suggested that 
it is vain to pursue precision. The suggestion will almost 
certainly be considered to be inadequate, but it need be 
pursued no further here. It will be shown to be inadequate by 
being improved, or shown to be mistaken through being corrected 
My claim is that as with any metaphor it is meaningful if it 
conveys something, and what it conveys can be restated. 
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It may be instructive here to compare the paraphrase of a 
metaphorical statement with the explanation of a joke. If a 
joke is understood it is standardly through the apprehension of 
some underlying logic, usually of a rather perverse nature. 
But it is notorious that the explanation is usually not the 
slightest degree amusing, and it may be tempting to claim that 
the explanation has therefore omitted the most essential element. 
Prom there we could go on to claim therefore that jokes contain 
some mysterious transcendent element which lies beyond the 
bounds of explanation. Our apprehension of a joke calls for 
a special act of intuition or immediate awareness which we are 
simply unable to account for in any illuminating fashion. Such 
a view seems to me misguided. Like metaphors, jokes have a 
tensive element which it is the whole point of the joke to 
discharge. This element is dissipated by the prolixity of the 
explanation, but it is not an element of the joke in the sense 
in which the component statements are. 
The paraphrase of a metaphorical statement inevitably 
lacks the charm of the original in much the same way. It is 
extremely tedious to provide it in those cases where the 
meaning has in fact been grasped: but it is always possible to 
provide it, at least to the extent that it has been grasped. 
And in cases where the statement is unfamiliar or unclear 
it is necessary to explore it if we are to grasp it at all. 
C H A P T E R S I X 
Metaphor and Categories 
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Thus far the enquiry has focussed principally on the use 
of metaphor in description and explanation. The main points 
which I hope to have established are that metaphor is 
cognitively significant and important, and that our understanding 
of it does not call for any special cognitive faculty. In this 
chapter I intend to diverge from this theme, and consider some 
problems associated with the notion of categories. I have 
already used such expressions as "categorization", "structure", 
"sorting", and others, in an informal way, and what I hope to 
do now is to sharpen these notions, so far as this is possible. 
1 think that in gaining some familiarity with categorial notions 
we shall improve our understanding of the nature of metaphor. 
My approach to categories will be extremely selective. I 
have already drawn attention to some common features between 
metaphor and category mistakes, and this will form the starting 
point of the present chapter. It is extremely common to find 
references to categories in accounts of metaphor, and vice 
verse. The thread which I intend to pursue has its 
antecedents in the philosophyoof Gilbert Ryle, the great 
popularizer of the category mistake. The most significant 
refinements of his basic principles of which I am aware have 
been produced by Fred Sommers, and by examining Sommers' theory 
we shall gain some understanding of the nature of a category 
mistake. This in turn reveals some important features of 
metaphor, and has, I think, important implications concerning 
the nature of natural languages. 
99 
The most explicit statement about the connection between 
metaphor and category mistakes has been provided by Colin 
Turbayne. Turbayne says that Ryle's definition of a category 
mistake, viz., 
It represents the facts...as if they belonged to 
one type or category (or range of types or ^ 
categories), when they actually belong to another. 
2 
is "...about the best definition of metaphor known to me" . 
Turbayne thinks that the idea of category alienation or "sort-
crossing" is "the first defining feature of metaphor" . 
Metaphors, however, are not just category mistakes: they are 
made wittingly. The mistake arises when we cross sorts without 
awareness, and when this happens metaphor generates myth. When 
sort-trespassing is used consciously, that is when we are aware 
of some inappropriateness in the use of the expression, the 
enterprise is perfectly respectable. 1 have already mentioned 
Goodman's description of metaphor as "a calculated category 
li 
mistake" , and like Turbayne he directs the interested reader 
to Ryle for an account of this notion. 
Roger Brown accounts for metaphor as a process of relating 
5 
two categories by revealing a superordinate category^, and 
Cassirer says of "radical metaphor" that "...it is not only a 
transition to another category, but actually the creation of 
the category itself"^. Although the notion of a category is 
freely mentioned in such discussions it is not given any but the 
most cursory examination. Conversely, we find reference to 
1 Ryle, Concept of Mind, p.l6 
2 Turbayne, Myth of Metaphor, p.l8 
3 Ibid., p.11 
4 Goodman, Languages of Art, p.73 
5 Brown, Words and Things, p.l40 
6 Cassirer, Language and Myth, p.88 
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metaphor from time to time in discussions of categories: 
Fred Sommers writes that by reformulating sentences containing 
the misuse of an expression as a consistent metaphor, "we 
can always reinstate a sentence on which a sense decision 
7 'nonsense' has been reached" . 
Whether or not metaphor always involves the alienation of 
categories will depend on how we choose to read the notion. On 
Goodman's account what constitutes a category or schema is 
characterized J with his nominalist leanings, as a set of 
predicates or labels. He says that a schema is usually "...a 
g 
linear or more complex array of labels" . The aggregate of 
the ranges of extension of the labels in a schema constitute a 
realm, and the schema may be transferred to a different aspect 
of experience, an alien realm, and used there to reorganize 
that realm. Since metaphor always involves resorting or 
reclassification, in this sense it will always involve an 
alienation of categories. There are two points I want to make 
here in connection with Goodman's account. First, the account 
suggests that a schema consists of a scale of predicates, an 
ordered sequence from which the metaphor is selected. In fact 
the majority of metaphors are not quite so neat. The example 
which Goodman considers in greatest detail, "the painting is 
sad", can perhaps be viewed in this manner, for we could 
plausibly produce a linear range of predicates along a sad-
happy axis. But in cases like "the room is a drum" It seems to 
me false to suggest that there is anything like an ordered 
sequence of labels. The experience of the room is certainly 
7 Sommers, "The Ordinary Language Tree", p.l67 
8 Goodman, op. cit., p.73 
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structured, but in a highly specific way which could only 
be accommodated within a schema account by unduly stretching 
that notion. 
The second point concerns Goodman's despair at producing 
a general account of how metaphor operates. He writes 
"...why things have the properties, literal or metaphorical, 
that they do have...Is a task I am content to leave to the 
cosmologlst"^. That Is, there Is no general answer to how a 
label Is used to reorganize an alien realm. In one sense 
Goodman's despair Is perfectly justified. It would be 
fruitless to search for a general account because different 
metaphors represent different ways of structuring aspects of 
experience. But the dismissal Is a little too cavalier, for 
In dismissing the possibility of a general explanation 
Goodman seems close to dismissing explanation In general. 
Though we can despair of a general account In one sense, I 
hope to have established that each specific case can be and 
must be able to be explained. 
The second notion of a category Is that used in discussions 
of ontology. It is this metaphysically heavier sense which 
Ryle seems to have been concerned with, and which has been 
laboriously refined by Sommers. In this sense, prima facie, 
metaphor need not involve category alienation; there is, for 
example, no obviously relevant ontologlcal difference between 
rooms and drums. It is this second sense of category which 
I shall now consider. 
9 Ibid., p.78 
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Kyle's account of a category mistake Is based on the 
assumption that a predicate cannot univocally span two 
subjects that differ in type. His philosophy of mind involves 
the claim that since bodies and minds are of different types, 
the predicate "exists", and others, cannot be used univocally 
to span both these subjects^*^. In general, if any two subjects 
a and b differ in type, there is no predicate P which can be 
univocally asserted of both. Since only subjects belonging 
to the same type can share predicates, hetero-typical subjects 
enforce predicate ambiguity, or in many cases, Ryle suggests, 
absurdity. Sommers has argued that Ryle's type-assumption is 
too strong. Although Russell and continuity are evidently of 
different types, they are univocally spanned by the predicate 
11 12 'is thought about' . This can be shown by a comparison test , 
for it makes sense to say that "continuity is thought about 
more than Russell". This test seems to me a perfectly correct 
way of testing for predicate univocity, and therefore I think 
that Sommers' rejection of Ryle's type-assumption is quite 
justified. But Sommers is unwilling to follow Quine's 
conclusion that hetero-typical subjects never enforce predicate 
equivocity^^, and the problem is: "When does a type-
14 difference enforce ambiguity on a predicate?" 
10 On "exists" see Ryle, op. cit., p.l6 
11 Sommers, "Types and Ontology", p.l4l 
12 Sommers, "Predicability", p.263 
13 Quine, Word and Object, pp.130-131. This has the effect of 
eliminating type-distinctions altogether, which of course is 
Quine's objective. 
14 Sommers, op. cit., p.263 
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Sommers proposes a weakened version of Ryle's type-
assumption: 
Two things are of different types if and only if 
there are two predicates P and Q such that it 
makes sense to predicate P of the first thing 
but not of the second, and it makes sense to 
predicate Q of the second thing but not of the 
first. ^ 
1 shall abbreviate this criterion for type difference as CTD. 
Further, there can be no third thing which is spanned by P 
and Q. Such an individual would be a member of two distinct 
categories, which for Sommers is not a logically possible 
state of affairs. Thus we have a rule for enforcing ambiguity 
(REA): 
If a, b, and c_ are any three things and P and Q 
are predicates such that it makes sense to 
predicate P of a and b but not of c_ and it makes 
sense to predicate Q of b and c_ but not of a, 
then P must be equivocal over a and b or Q must 
be equivocal over b and c_. Conversely, if P and 
Q are univocal predicates, then there can be no 
three things, a, b, and c_ such that P applies to 
a and b but n^^ to c_ while Q applies to b and c 
but not to a. 
By applying REA to "spirits" (or "egos"), "persons", and 
"rocks", and the predicates "thinks" and "weighs a hundred 
pounds", Sommers proceeds to establish that we must give up 
talk of "spirits" or accept Cartesian dualism. 
There are a few points that should be noted. First there 
is a problem in applying REA. Sommers notes "...the rule 
17 
does not tell us which of the two predicates is ambiguous" , 
and this may be a matter of considerable philosophical 
importance which REA will be of no assistance in resolving. 
15 Ibid., p.265 
16 Ibid., pp.265-266 
17 Ibid., p.266 
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There is also the further complicating possibility, not 
explicit in REA but noted elsewhere by Sommers, that one or 
more of the subject terms may lack the categorial integrity 
which Sommers demands of an individual. Ignoring the latter 
point, there may be some real dispute about which predicate 
is ambiguous. At one point Strawson seems to be prepared to 
find equivocity in predicates like "weighs a hundred pounds"; 
that is, in the so-called "M-predicates", which are said to 
18 
span material particulars . This seems to me a difficult 
thesis to maintain, since it would preclude allowing significance 
to such statements as "Strawson weighs as much as that rock". 
Yet the whole notion of Strawson having a particular weight 
derives ultimately from comparison with material particulars. 
But the solutions offered by Sommers are no more inviting. One 
suggestion is that we adopt Cartesian dualism. Another, 
favoured in several places by Sommers is "...if we consider 
spirits to be the same type of thing as persons...all the M-1Q denials might be true of them" Thus "...it would be 
significant though probably false to say that spirits weigh 
2 0 
five pounds" . To accept "Smith's mind weighs five pounds" 
as significant, "though probably false", is, to say the least, 
counter-intuitive. 
There have been a number of attempts to construct counter-
examples to REA. Erwin takes the three subjects "headache^', 
"parades", and "pretty girls" and the predicates "was watched" 
18 Strawson, Individuals, p.105 
19 Sommers, "A Programme for Coherence", p.527 
20 Ibid., p.527 
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and "started at 3 p.m."^^. "Was watched" can be predicated 
of parades and people but not headaches, and "started at 
3 p.m." of parades and headaches but not people. Furthermore 
the predications seem to pass the comparison test for unlvoclty: 
headaches may last as long as the parade, and pretty girls can 
be watched as much as the parade. 1 suspect that Sommers here 
would attempt to split the subject-term "parade". The 
22 splitting of subject-terms Is a point 1 will return to shortly 
The proof of CTD can be deduced, Sommers claims, "...from 
23 certain simple laws of predication" . The argument commences 
with the claim that "...predication Is transitive but not 
24 / y symmetrical" . Asymmetry of predication (rather than non-
symmetry) seems natural enough, but the transitivity claim Is 
rather surprising. While "man" can be predicated of Socrates 
and "species" of man, we cannot predicate "species" of 
Socrates. But before we dwell on the details perhaps we should 
give the argument a chance to develop. 
Sommers uses a reverse arrow to signify the predlcablllty 
relation. His account Is developed from a number of definitions, 
the most Important of which I shall signalize. First we are 
21 Erwln, Meanlnglessness, pp.73-7^ 
22 Another most Interesting and apparently damaging attack on 
REA, and Incidentally CTD and Sommers' "tree rule" (which 
1 shall not consider), has been developed by A.G. Elgood, 
who has proposed a general method for constructing counter-
examples to REA. But REA leaves open so many escape routes 
that It Is reasonable to suppose that Sommers could find 
some pretext for rejecting any counter-example which is 
proposed. But, as we have seen with "Smith's mind", the 
battle to retain the integrity of REA results in some 
extraordinary and counter-intuitive semantic claims. 
23 Sommers, "Predlcablllty", p.272 
24 Ibid., p.272 
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told "...a term is said to be predicable of a thing if and 
25 only if either the affirmation or denial is true" 
Symbolically J we have: 
D1 P ^ a = P a v P ' a 
If the term is impredicable of the thing we have a category 
mistake: "Category mistakes are false statements whose denials 
2 6 
are false" . Denial must be distinguished from negation on 
Sommers' account. For the law of excluded middle, which 
Sommers wishes to retain, claims that the negation of a false 
statement is true. Sommers therefore distinguishes denial and 
negation as two distinct ways of gainsaying a statement. These 
correspond to predicate negation and statement negation 
respectively^"^. The distinction, which is central to Sommers' 
account of category mistakes, is another matter we shall return 
to. 
The transitivity of predication is a consequence of an 
extension of the relation "is predicable of" to hold between 
two predicates as well as between individuals and predicates: 
"P is predicable of Q if and only if P is predicable of 28 whatever Q is predicable" . Thus: 
D2 P Q = (x)((Qx V Q'x) D (PX V P'X)) 
A category mistake, which was introduced in terms of the notion 
of impredicability in Dl, is correspondingly extended to hold 
between general terms: 
25 Ibid., p.272 
26 Ibid., p.272 
27 I shall adopt the convention used by Sommers of using a 
dash to indicate statement negation, and an apostrophe 
following a predicate symbol for predicate negation. 
28 Sommers, op. cit., p.275 
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...we can now define the class of category 
mistakes that tie two general terms In a 
predicative tie. A statement 'Some P Is Q' 
Is a category mistake If P Is Impredlcatle 
of Q and Q Is Impredlcable of P...a category 
mistake contains terms predlc-able In neither 
direction. 
Sommers calls such terms "N-related". Hence 
D3 N(P,Q) = -((P-f—Q) V (Q-<— P)) 
The symbol "U" Is used for "a pair of terms predlcable of one 
another In at least one dlrectlon"^^. Thus Sommers obtains 
D3.1 U(P,Q) = (P-(—Q) V ( Q - ^ P ) 
which Is just another way of stating D3. 
Next we are told that "...If a statement Is category-
correct, then there Is at least one Individual of which 'Is P' 
31 
or 'Is not P' Is true and 'Is Q' or 'Is not Q' Is true" 
That Is 
D4 U(P,Q) = (Ex)((Px V P'x)(Qx v Q'x)) 
To rehearse the account so far. Predlcablllty was Introduced 
with respect to an Individual (Dl) and the notion was then 
extended as a relation between predicates (D2). Category 
Incorrect statements contain mutually Impredlcable or N-related 
terms (D3), that Is, terms for which there Is no Individual 
spanned by the terms (D4). The theory obviously stands In 
need of some account of what Is to count as an Individual. 
Sommers presents the following criterion for Individuality: 
An entity x Is an Individual If and only If every 
pair of predicates P and Q that Is true of x Is 
such that either E Is predlcable of Q or Q Is 
predlcable of P.^ 
29 Ibid., p.276 
30 Ibid., p.276 
3 1 Ibid., p.277 
32 Ibid., p.279 
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There is evidently the following problem with Sommers' account. 
Predicability was introduced with respect to Individuals, 
and Individuals are accounted for by the notion of predicability. 
Using "I" for "is an individual" we have: 
D5 la = ((P-f a)(Q-f a) D ((P-f Q) v —^P))) 
D5 follows from the definitions given earlier. If 
-((PH Q) V — P ) ) , from D3 we have N(P,Q) and from d4 
-(Ex)(Px v P'x)(Qx V Q'x). It is implicit in the account that 
33 
the quantifiers are intended to range over Individuals , so 
that any apparent individual which entertains N-related 
predicates will turn out to be a categorially composite subject 
rather than an individual. That is, there is no such thing 
as an individual which is spanned by N-related predicates. 
I think there is a problem in treating "is predicable of" 
as a transitive relation, which can be brought out by considering 
the "Socrates" example I mentioned at the beginning. Since 
there is something, namely Socrates, that "species" is not 
predicable of, although "man" is; that is, "species" is not 
predicable of whatever "man" is predicable; it follows from 
D2 that "species" is not predicable of man. And since I think 
any view would reject the claim that "man" is predicable of 
species, it follows from D3 that "man is a species" is a 
category mistake. 
1 think there is also a difficulty with Sommers' notion 
of an individual. The logical restriction which Sommers places 
on individuals is that they cannot entertain N-related 
predicates. Speaking categorially, if a is an individual and 
p and Q are categorially different predicates which apply to a. 
33 See the derivation of D4, Ibid., p.277 
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34 then one category is contained In the other . We can adopt a 
pair of predicates which are prima facie N-related, (such as 
"thinks", "weighs ten stone"), and pronounce any subject which 
apparently entertains them to lack the categorlal Integrity 
of Individuality. But It Is equally open to Insist that a 
subject, such as Socrates, ^ an Individual, in which case we 
must treat the predicates as U-related. That Is, we can simply 
Insist that there Is an Individual which can serve as a value 
for the rlght-hand-slde of D4, and hence that the predicates In 
question are U-related. 
There Is an apparent circularity In Sommers' account; 
predlcablllty Is defined In terms of Individuals which serve 
as the values of his variables, and Individuals are defined In 
terms of predlcablllty. This Is not apparent because the 
selection of examples proceeds In accordance with our linguistic 
Intuitions. If the theory Is applied In this fashion It may 
be that this circularity Is not In fact vicious. But the logic 
of Individuals and co-predlcable terms enforces ambiguity (or 
nonsense) In all cases where the assumption of unlvoclty generates 
conflict from the definitions. REA enforces ambiguity quite 
mercilessly from the appropriately chosen heterotyplcal subjects 
to which It Is applied. This leaves no room for anything like 
displacement of sense, which Is crucial for metaphor. Any 
figurative use of an expression which Involves the transgression 
of categorlal boundaries will be characterized as a quite 
distinct sense from the one It possessed In Its category of 
origin. The cognitive significance of metaphor cannot be 
explained on, and tells against such an account. 
34 Sommers' proof of this appears In the appendix to 
"Types and Ontology", p.169 
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Even if v/e allow our linguistic intuitions to provide 
some basis for the U-relation, and thereby an escape from 
Sommers' circle of definitions, further problems remain. We 
have already seen that division into a body that weighs ten 
stone and a pure Cartesian ego that thinks is in Sommers' view 
an "ontologically coherent" solution to Smith's problems. But 
the division of Smith does not stop here. Smith can have a 
headache for an hour, and Smith can think that p. But he 
cannot think that p for an hour (though he can think about 
Q 5 
something, such as the thought that p, for an hour) . And 
he can express his thought that p, but he cannot express his 
headache (though he may express the fact that he has a headache) 
So the Smith with a headache, which is not the Smith that weighs 
ten stone, is different again from the Smith that thinks that p. 
Sommers may wish to challenge some of these claims, but 
I think that with sufficient ingenuity in applying CTD we can 
continue splitting subject terms until the individuals which 
we are 'really' speaking of are extremely remote from the 
natural subjects of discourse. But perhaps this splitting 
would not cause Sommers much concern. At one point he writes 
that a good logical theory can "...indefinitely continue to 
generate the ambiguities necessary to preserve its rules in the 
face of actual usage"^^. "In the teeth of actual usage" would 
perhaps be more apposite. 
1 will not pursue Sommers' approach to the theory of 
types much further. It is, we have seen, an attempt to develop 
Ryle's notion of a category mistake with a neo-Russellian 
35 See Geach, Mental Acts, pp.103-106 
36 Sommers, "A Program for Coherence", p.527 
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formal ontology. Whereas Russell's type-theory committed him 
to the generation of multiple-ambiguities from the splitting of 
predicates, Sommers' reaches a similarly unpalatable 
consequence from the splitting of particulars. 
The Implications of a Sommers-type theory of category 
mistakes for metaphor, if accepted, would create serious 
difficulties. Metaphor is concerned with extensions of meaning 
and continuities of sense, whereas REA and CTD can inform us 
only of discontinuities and differences. Indeed the cognitive 
significance of metaphor I think casts some doubt on a Sommers-
type formal attempt to develop category criteria to rule out 
certain combinations of expressions as meaningless or 
ambiguous. Sommers at one point notes the ambiguity of 
"rational" as applied to men and arguments but there is, 
prima facie, some sense relation between its application to 
these heterotypical subjects which seems lacking when "rational" 
is applied to men and numbers, for example. 
On Sommers' theory the meaning of an expression is something 
which is rigidly fixed by its sense relations to other 
expressions in the language, and any change in its sense 
relations to these other expressions appears to generate a 
sense which his theory is bound to treat as quite distinct from 
the former one. This is the central assumption of what I 
characterized as the Principle of Univocity in chapter 1. The 
consequences of this sort of account for a theory of metaphor 
are noted quite explicitly by Sommers: 
37 Ibid., p.526 
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If, metaphorically, I wish to speak of an Itch 
as a mood or a mood as an Itch, then to be 
consistent In my metaphor I must also allow for 
the sense of "My mood was on my chest" or any 
other place on the body. Carrying a metaphor 
through consistently is nothing more than 
giving it those sense relations whichgthe data 
sentences of ordinary language have. 
But to claim that an expression retains all its previous 
sense relations is tantamount to claiming that its former sense 
has been exactly retained. To say that an expression is used 
metaphorically and that it preserves all its former sense 
relations is certainly in conflict with the foregoing account, 
and seems to me to in fact amount to a contradiction. 
Metaphors simply are not carried through consistently in the 
way Sommers suggests here, and this is of course why they are 
able to produce displacement in meaning. 
A category mistake, it will be recalled, was initially 
characterized by Sommers as a false statement whose denial is 
false. Because Sommers wishes to retain the doctrine that the 
negation of a false statement is true, he introduced the denial-
negation distinction: 
...the term clean is impredicable of the equator 
since neither the affirmation 'is clean' nor the 
denial 'is not clean' is true of the equator... 
it is not the case that the equator is clean, 
nor is it the case that the equator is unclean 
(or not clean). 
A num-ber of other philosophers have concluded that since 
neither the affirmation of a category mistake nor its denial is 
true, a category mistake is meaningless. Arthur Pap, for 
example, writes: 
38 Sommers, "The Ordinary Language Tree", p.179 
39 Sommers, "Predicability", pp.272-273 
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...the distinction between the false and the 
meaningless is already recognized by common-
sense apart from any preoccupation with logical 
theory. 'The theory of relativity is blue', 
'the number 5 weighs more than the number 6', 
'his mind eats fish': these and millions more 
predications would unhesitatingly be dismissed 
as meaningless, not fa^ge, in spite of their 
syntactic correctness. (Pap's emphasis) 
Paul Benacerraf agrees with Pap, and provides a curious reason 
for rejecting the claim 'false': "It will be just as hard to 
explain how one knows that they are false as it would be to 
4l 
explain how one knows that they are senseless" . This seems 
to me quite mistaken. 
Sommers' suggestion seems to be that we can identify "not 
clean" with "unclean" (or "dirty"). But it is not clear that 
this should be allowed without, at least, further argument. 
If it were the case it would provide a strong reason for 
considering "the equator is not clean" to be false. But it is 
by no means self-evident that "the equator is not clean" is 
false, in fact it seems to me just as evident that this 
statement is true, and indeed must be true. How could the 
equator possibly be clean? The equator is not clean because it 
is not the sort of thing that could under any circumstances be 
clean. The statement is false, rather than neither true nor 
false, though evidently enough it is not empirically false. 
If a statement were genuinely senseless it is difficult to see 
how we could make anything of it at all. But category mistakes, 
unlike 'sentences' which are grossly ill-formed syntactically are 
intelligible at least to the extent that we see them to be 
mistakes, and furthermore we can provide some account of why 
they are mistakes. I shall come back to this point shortly. 
40 Pap, "Types and Meaninglessness", p.4l 
41 Benacerraf, "What Numbers Could Not Be", p.66 
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Richard Routley also favours what we might call the 
'meaningless' thesis, and attempts to prove that 'the number 
hp 
seven dislikes dancing' is neither true nor false . The 
negation of this statement is 'the number seven doesn't dislike 
dancing'. This statement is also not true. But the negation of 
a false statement must be true. So 'the number seven dislikes 
dancing' is neither true nor false. The weakness of this 
argument, which is noted by Erwin , is the assumption without 
further argument that 'the number seven doesn't dislike dancing' 
is not true. It might be thought that this statement entails 
the absurdity that 'the number seven likes dancing' but it 
is not clear why this should be accepted. And it would be 
equally mistaken to conclude that since the number seven 
neither likes nor dislikes dancing that it is Indifferent to 
dancing. The truth is that "...the number seven does not have 44 an opinion about dancing, or about anything else" 
The function of negation is to deny the applicability of 
a particular predicate to whatever is specified by the subject 
expression. It seems to be a thesis of those who deny truth 
value to category-incorrect statements that negation carries 
with it categorially affirmative force. Thus it is supposed 
that if it is true that "the theory of relativity is not blue" 
or that "virtue is not square" it would have to follow that the 
theory of relativity is some other colour or that virtue is 
some other shape. Certainly if the theory of relativity was red, 
or virtue round, this would be a reason for accepting the truth 
42 Routley, "On a Significance Theory", p.l8l 
43 Erwin, op. cit., p.135 
44 Ibid., p.135 
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of these examples. And the majority of our statements are 
negated for just this sort of reason: a predicate is excluded 
because some logically similar but incompatible predicate is 
affirmed. But it should not be uncritically assumed that this 
constitutes the only reason for denying the applicability of 
a particular predicate, or that the denial carries with it some 
additional affirmative claim (apart from the obvious 
affirmation of the truth of the denial). Thus Arthur Prior 
writes: 
...in saying virtue is not square I am not saying 
it is any other shape...! am saying that the 
thing ig(-not square, and that is all that I am 
saying. 
This is not quite the full story. We do have certain predicate 
gainsaying devices such as the prefixes "non-", "un-", "dis-" 
and the like, which in fact may carry some affirmative force. 
Thus predicates like "dislikes" or "unpopular" are used to 
convey a positive attribution, and the logic of negation is 
frequently clouded because they are often loosely used 
as interchangeable with "not". But their logical behaviour is 
importantly different from negation, and this is brought out 
in the discussion of Routley's example above. For although 
"likes" is incompatible with "dislikes" as well as with "does 
not like"; "does not dislike" does not entail "likes". These 
devices do not function like "not", though since predicates are 
standardly denied with a view to affirming some other with a 
comparable range of applicability, we often find "not" behaving 
in a very similar manner to these prefixes. Thus we would under 
most circumstances take "does not dislike" as a somewhat 
45 Prior, "Entities", p.l60 
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tentative and unemphatlc affirmation of affinity. But 
though this may be suggested by the locution It Is certainly 
not entailed. 
Against Sommers, Pap, Benacerraf, and Routley, Prior 
proposes that statements such as "virtue Is not square" are 
not meaningless but true. Prior writes: 
My proof that virtue Is not square Is a simple 
syllogism - what Is square has some shape, but 
virtue ^as no shape, therefore virtue Is not 
square. 
Prior's argument provides an answer to Benacerraf's charge that 
It is as difficult to establish falsehood as meaninglessness. 
Whereas the 'meaningless' claim, where it is not simply 
assumed, is said to be 'obvious' or 'self-evident', the approach 
suggested by Prior is able to provide some reason why the 
applicability of a particular predicate should be denied. 
Perhaps a proponent of the 'meaningless' thesis would argue 
that we are quite able to see why some statements are 
meaningless: it is just because all significant statements 
have some truth value, and this is not true of statements which 
Involve a categorlal mis-match. But this simply presupposes 
that category mistakes have no truth value; it cannot establish 
the claim. 
Prior's argument is likely to be attacked on the ground 
that the premise "virtue has no shape" is itself meaningless. 
But I think that adopting this line of argument will lead to 
serious difficulties. Erwin points out that Prior could argue 
for the truth of this premise with the further premises 
46 Ibid., p.159 
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"...virtue is not in space, and anything which is not in space 
47 
has no shape" . To follow his attack consistently the 
'meaningless' proponent will presumably then have to argue that 
"virtue is not in space" is meaningless. But as the premises 
increase in generality the claim becomes increasingly counter-
intuitive. For knowing that virtue is not the sort of thing 
that is or could be in space seems to be a significant feature 
of our understanding of the notion. And to be consistent the 
objector will also have to rule out as meaningless such 
statements as "thoughts are not in space", a statement which 
seems to me to express an important categorial truth about the 
nature of thought. 
The statement "virtue is not in space" does not have the 
same prima facie quality of absurdity as "virtue is not square", 
but I think Prior's argument establishes that they stand or fall 
together. The argument also reveals why the second statement 
lacks the plausibility of the first. To say that virtue is 
not square suggests the possibility that virtue might be some 
other shape, for the predicate "square" can be denied either 
because of the presence of some incompatible shape, or because 
the item in question has no shape at all. The claim that it has 
no shape is therefore more perspicuous, and is the claim which 
would presumably be standardly made. 1 think for this reason 
we are justified in thinking that the statement "virtue is not 
square" is misleading; but nevertheless I think Prior's 
argument establishes that it is in fact true. 
47 Erwin, op. cit., p.134 
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Category mistakes, then, are false statements rather than 
statements which are neither true nor false. But evidently 
enough they are not empirically false. It is an a priori truth 
that whatever is square has some shape, and it is therefore 
false a priori that virtue is square. There is no conceivable 
state of affairs which could make "virtue is square" true. To 
establish that my left eye-ball is not square. Prior says, it 
is sufficient to establish that it is some other shape^^, but 
to establish that virtue is not square we can proceed by showing 
that there is no shape that it could have. The premises we use 
in these two cases are different in nature, but, as Prior 
emphasizes, there is no significant difference in the logic of 
the arguments. But although category mistakes are false a 
priori, not all a priori false statements are category mistakes. 
Explicit contradictions such as "some bachelors are not 
bachelors", and implicit contradictions like "some bachelors are 
married" are also a priori false, but we would not want to call 
them category mistakes. The a priori falsehood of category 
mistakes emerges from the a priori truth of propositions like 
"whatever has shape is in space". 
At the beginning of the chapter I said that the notion 
of a category is sometimes used broadly to mean any 
classificatory schema we might employ, and sometimes in a more 
'metaphysical' sense to suggest a limited and perhaps 
specifiable number of sorts of things which there are in the 
world. In the last analysis I think this comes down to the 
question of whether there is any difference between a category 
and a class. A category of course is a class, but do we have 
48 Prior, op. cit., p.l60 
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any special features which enable us to differentiate a 
category from the more general notion? Is there any way of 
distinguishing the business of category-allocation from that 
of class-allocation in general? The most widely known and 
influential negative answer is almost certainly the one provided 
by Quine, whose well-known conclusion is that the only difference 
between zoologist and ontologist is breadth of interest^^. Ryle 
we have seen proposed the view that mis-classification resulted 
in falsehood and mis-categorization in absurdity, but failed to 
provide any means of distinguishing the false from the absurd. 
I have followed Prior in suggesting that Ryle was in any case 
mistaken, and that category mistakes are false rather than 
absurd, though a priori rather than empirically false. 
To attempt to unravel all the issues that lie behind the 
alleged category-class distinction would take us well beyond 
our present needs. Some writers have recently suggested that 
this venerable distinction is in any case probably spurious. 
Bernard Harrison's conclusion that "...there is no adequate 
logical criterion for distinguishing category errors from 
50 
errors of other kinds" seems, at least at present, to be 
perfectly justified. The most thorough attempt to provide 
logical criteria for category-errors is to be found in the 
theory of Sommers, and I have indicated the principal 
difficulties which 1 think emerge from his approach. 
In my account of categories nothing like the heavy meta-
physical sense of this notion has emerged. It might therefore 
be thought desirable to abandon talk of categories in favour of 
49 Quine, op. cit., p.275 
50 Harrison, "Category Mistakes and Rules of Language", p.314 
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classes, but I think this would be a mistake. The 
investigation shows, I think, that the category-class 
distinction is in fact a useful one to retain, though the way it 
should be drawn is in fact quite different from the traditional 
Aristotelian approach. I think we should use the term 
'categorization' to indicate the a priori assignment of a 
predicate, and 'classification' to indicate any assignment 
which is determined empirically. Quine of course would reject 
the a priori-empirical distinction as spurious, and if we 
followed him in this it would leave no basis for the category-
class distinction. However I will assume the a priori-empirical 
distinction is viable, though I shall make no attempt here to 
justify it. 
The important point to note for our purposes is that the 
crossing of category boundaries does not have to be treated as 
inevitably generating meaninglessness. And so metaphors which 
cross category boundaries need be no more problematic with 
respect to significance than those which simply cross 
'classification' boundaries. 
Category mistakes, then, are a priori false, and they 
share this feature with metaphorical statements. In 
demonstrating the a priori falsehood of a categorial mis-match, 
we rely on such statements as "whatever is square has some 
shape"; truths independent of experience, in Lewis's phrase, 
true "no matter what". In showing a statement to be metaphorical 
the inappropriateness is demonstrated in the same wort of way. 
Thus Goodman writes of "the painting is sad" that "...the 
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picture's being Insentient Implies that It Is neither sad 
nor gay"^^. It Is an a priori truth that only sentient beings 
are either sad or gay. 
There are two aspects of grasping a metaphorical statement. 
First we must recognize that the modifier Is Inappropriate as 
the result of some a priori truth concerning Its correct 
application. Ultimately this Is a consequence of the fact that 
there are no concepts which are meaningful In Isolation: 
descriptive terms like "sad" can only be understood If we 
understand that sentient beings are the only things of which 
they can be true. And if we did not understand that squareness 
is a shape we would not have grasped this concept. In 
demonstrating the Inapproprlateness in category mistakes and in 
metaphor we uncover the conceptual presuppositions which underlie 
the use of particular descriptive terms. But in understanding 
a metaphorical statement we have to take the further step of 
seeing that, despite its a priori falsehood, there is also 
some way in which the statement is illuminating. 
The significance of metaphor can be viewed as a counter-
example to those theories which attempt to exclude as 
meaningless all statements which are categorially incorrect. 
Both metaphor and category mistakes share this feature of being 
a priori false, but there is an important difference. What is 
really the source of the polntlessness of such statements as 
"anger is triangular" or "the theory of relativity is blue" is 
that having established their a priori falsehood along the lines 
I have suggested, there is no apparent way of taking the second 
51 Goodman, op. cit., p.70 
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step to show that the statement Is nevertheless Illuminating^^. 
But in the case of metaphor we can go on to provide some 
reasons for their appropriateness; that is, their truth^^. 
The reasons for accepting the truth of metaphor are spelt out 
in the paraphrase. 
There are of course false metaphors. Thus Goodman says 
that to call his painting sad is false both literally and 
metaphorically. But this description is not simply meaningless, 
for we can describe ways in which the painting might have been 
different so as to make the metaphorical attribution true. It 
would be a mistake then to suppose that the truth of 
metaphorical statements is also a priori. Once the sense of 
the metaphor has been established through the paraphrase, we 
may well go on and test its truth empirically. We can, as 
Beardsley observes, develop tests for the sharpness of winds 
or tongues, just as we can develop them for razors or knives^^. 
The a priori falsehood of metaphor and category mistakes emerges 
from the conceptual presuppositions which govern the correct 
application of expressions independently of what happens to 
be the case. Empirical truth or falsehood is shown, crudely, 
by seeing what happens in the world. And what happens to be 
the case is of considerable importance for the correct 
attribution of a metaphor. 
52 Though as I noted earlier, with some ingenuity and 
imagination, it is usually possible to dream up some way 
of paraphrasing nonsense into sense. But whereas this 
usually involves a conscious effort on our part to impose 
sense, a fine metaphor seemsto draw us on. 
53 I have not explicitly discussed the application of the notion 
of truth to metaphor. There is a question whether the so-
called "aptness" of metaphor may be correctly identified 
with truth. On this matter I am in agreement with Goodman: 
"Truth and its aesthetic counterpart amount to appropriateness 
under different names". (Languages of Art, p.264) 
54 Beardsley, Aesthetics, p.135 
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The significance of metaphor also suggests that it would 
be a mistake to suppose that categorizations are rigid, or 
that anything like an invariant sense structure is a necessary 
precondition for the meaningfulness of natural languages. 
R.C. Cross suggests: 
One should not expect that in their actual 
behaviour words will always fall into sharp and 
clearly defined and exclusive patterns, or that 
there is some easy and simple test to determine 
their patterns. A crossing of patterns need not 
produce nonsense - as a trivial example, while 
we want, for most purposes to distinguish the 
logical patterns of sound words and colour wordSn-
a phrase like 'loud colour' makes good sense... 
It is no accident that Cross has chosen a palpable, if 
transparent, metaphor to illustrate the facility with which a 
priori categorial boundaries may be crossed with manifest 
intelligibility. The Principle of Univocity and all its 
trappings must, as Richards observed, be rejected by a language 
which is vitally metaphorical. Language itself is the counter-
example to any such attempt to explain its cognitive capacity. 
The question of why we select the particular metaphorical 
expressions that we do to describe unfamiliar aspects of our 
surroundings is one for which I know of no satisfactory 
explanation. That we come to grips with the novel by amending 
and extending the familiar seems natural and inevitable: for 
how else could we proceed? It would be no help to suggest, 
for example, that Schon selected the description "drum" to 
describe the room he found himself in because that is what the 
room was like. This leaves us, at the end of the enquiry, with 
one of the most striking aspects of the phenomenon of metaphor 
quite unexplained. 
55 Cross, "Category Differences", p.264 
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My aim in the enquiry has been to attempt to show that 
3-fter a particular metaphorical expression has been selected, 
some explanation of its operation can be provided. I have 
argued not just that a paraphrase can be provided, but that the 
possibility of paraphrase is in fact a precondition of the 
significance of metaphor. The paraphrase will not, however, be 
anything as simple as a literal comparison. Metaphors, like 
category mistakes, are statements which are a priori false, but 
a priori falsehood of itself does not prevent an expression from 
being revealing, sometimes in a quite striking manner. But 
striking though metaphor may be on occasions, it is not some 
supra-cognitive mode, any more than it is merely a decorative 
device. By arguing that metaphor is comprehensible in the same 
way that other language is, and that it can be explained in 
terms of the rest of language, I have placed it squarely on a 
level with the remainder of language; neither above it nor 
beneath it. 
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